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Editor's Note:
The Editorial Board and Staff of Volume 46 are very pleased to
announce that the following article by Deirdre M. Smith was cho-
sen as the winning entry in the 1994 SCRIBES Notes & Comments
Writing Competition. The Competition recognizes an outstanding
article written by a law student associated with a student edited
law review that exhibits the highest standards of clear, succinct,
and forceful legal writing.
CONFRONTING SILENCE: THE
CONSTITUTION, DEAF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS, AND THE RIGHT TO
INTERPRETATION DURING TRIAL
INTRODUCTION
Every person in the courtroom stands. Your attorney taps your
arm and gestures for you to do the same. As you rise you see the
judge enter the room. As she sits the courtroom sits as quickly and
uniformly as it stood, with you a moment behind. The judge looks
down at the papers in front of her and moves her mouth. Suddenly,
the prosecutor steps forward and faces the jury. You catch glimpses
of the meaningless gestures of his hands. This continues for ten min-
utes as you watch the expressions on the faces of the jurors. They
glance at you but quickly avert their eyes. On a few occasions, the
prosecutor turns toward you and extends his hand in your direction;
you recognize your name on his lips and sit up in your chair. Your
attorney passes you a note but your grade-school education renders
it nearly indecipherable.
These could be the opening moments of a deaf person's trial. For
most deaf 1 people, interactions with the hearing community in the
absence of interpretation or technological assistance consist of com-
munications that are, at most, only partly comprehensible. Criminal
proceedings, with the defendant's liberty interest directly at stake,
are occasions in which the need for deaf people to have a full under-
1. In this Comment, the term "deaf" will be used as sociologist Jerome Schein has
defined it: "Deaf people cannot hear and understand speech through the ear alone,
with or without amplification." JFRors D. ScHEIN, AT Hob- AAONG STRANGERS 5
(1989). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "deaf person"
as "[a]ny person whose hearing is totally impaired or whose hearing is so seriously
impaired as to prohibit the person from understanding oral communications when
spoken in a normal conversational tone."). Both of these definitions exclude "hard of
hearing" people who possess sufficient residual hearing to understand spoken lan-
guage with amplification. See also infra note 16 and accompanying text on the dis-
tinction between "deaf" and "Deaf."
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standing of what is said and done around them is most urgent.2
Ironically, the legal "right to interpretation" has not been clearly
defined in either statutory or case law. Although the federal and
state constitutions do not provide a separate or lesser set of rights
for deaf defendants, their situation remains unique. The complete
reliance on spoken and written English in the criminal justice pro-
cess systematically excludes full participation of almost all deaf peo-
ple. This factor, compounded by the general ignorance about deaf-
ness among hearing people, places deaf defendants at a serious
disadvantage.
The federal government and most state legislatures recognize the
injustice that results from a defendant's inability to understand the
proceedings that may result in punishment. These bodies have
passed legislation allowing or requiring interpretation for defendants
who cannot hear or understand English.3 This Comment argues,
however, that the right to interpretation at criminal proceedings is
already embodied in protections afforded all defendants through the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 The rights to effective assistance of counsel, to confront wit-
2. The criminal justice system is not the only adjudication system that can result
in the deprivation of liberty but it accounts for the vast majority of incarcerations. In
the civil context, proceedings such as those for civil contempt and immigration status
also can result in deprivation of liberty.
Discussion of the right to interpretation in the civil context, however, is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For discussion of interpretation in civil trials, see Gregg F.
Relyea, Note, Procedural Due Process: A Deaf Defendant's Right to Be Heard
Should Encompass a Right to "Hear" Civil Trials Through Interpretation, 29 CATm.
U.L. REV. 867 (1980); Sy DuBow ET AL., LEGAL RIGHTS: THE GUIDE FOR DEAF AND
HARD OF HEARING PEOPLE (4th ed. 1992). According to Elaine Gardner, Associate Le-
gal Director of the National Center for Law and Deafness, the Center's present focus
is on securing courtroom interpretation for civil litigants through enforcement of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991) (hereinaf-
ter ADA). Telephone interview with Elaine Gardner, Associate Legal Director of the
National Center of Law and Deafness (February, 1993). See, e.g., Baker v. Louisiana,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21599 (W.D. La. 1992) (dismissing an action brought under
ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp.
1993)) because civil litigant failed to request an interpreter for a family law proceed-
ing). See infra at notes 304-313 and accompanying text for discussion on the ADA.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 213-313.
4. Although the focus of this Comment is interpretation during criminal trials, the
constitutional protections during arrest require interpretation as well. The most com-
pelling problem is how to administer the warnings required under Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed," and these warnings must be full and effective. Id. at 444. The
requirement of full and effective warnings cannot be met unless there is adequate
communication between officers and suspects.
The problem of properly administering the warning is compounded by the fact that
even if the services of an interpreter are obtained immediately after arrest, the Mi-
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nesses against the defense, to be present at trial and assist in the
defense, and to understand the nature and cause of the charges, im-
pose a duty on the government to provide a defendant the means to
randa warnings are not easily translated into American Sign Language (ASL), espe-
cially for those deaf people who have low ASL and English skills or who rely on a
visual gestural system of communication. The written advice read to hearing suspects
requires a sixth-to-eighth grade reading level, DuBow Er A., supra note 2, at 176,
but, due to the disastrous quality of education of deaf children, the average deaf high
school graduate's reading level is closer to fourth grade, far below that of a hearing
graduate. OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VoicEs 28-29 (1989). Also, many of the terms and
concepts, such as "right" and even "lawyer," do not always translate easily into ASL
DuBow Er AL., supra note 2, at 176. Therefore, interpreters often must spend a great
deal of time explaining the terms of the warning before a suspect adequately under-
stands the full meaning and implications of that warning.
The challenges presented in the arrest of deaf suspects can be demonstrated by an
Oregon case, State v. Mason, 633 P.2d 820 (Or. App. 1981), where police attempted to
question a "low-verbal [ASL]" suspect initially with fingerspelling (using manual
signs to spell words in English) and then by using a psychologist at the station as an
interpreter. After thirty minutes the psychologist concluded that the defendant did
not understand his rights. Id. at 822. Although the suspect did sign Miranda and
polygraph waiver forms in the presence of another interpreter, the trial and appellate
courts concluded that he did not waive his rights. Id. at 826-27. The court stated that,
"to give Miranda warnings to this defendant so as to make an intelligent waiver pos-
sible would require an interpreter familiar with and competent in his primary lan-
guage. This he did not have." Id. at 827 n.8.
Some states have passed statutes specifically requiring the appointment of an inter-
preter upon the arrest of a deaf suspect. Oklahoma has passed such a law and it was
enforced against municipal police through a class action case brought against the City
of Oklahoma City. Kiddy v. City of Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1978). The
statute provides that, "[w]hen a deaf-mute is arrested he shall be entitled to the as-
sistance of an interpreter." Id. at 300 (citing 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 278 (re-
pealed in 1982 and replaced by 63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2707 (1984 & Supp. 1993)
which is essentially the same in this respect)). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in-
terpreted this language to mean that an interpreter would be provided "within a rea-
sonable time after arrest, presumably to enable the deaf-mute arrested to understand
the charges against him, and appreciate his constitutional rights. .. ." Kiddy v. City
of Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d at 301. The city jailed the lead plaintiff for two days
without providing an interpreter, reading his Miranda warnings, or informing him of
the charges. Id. In Pasadena, a deaf man was awarded $100,000 in damages against
the police force because they refused to appoint an interpreter for him and insisted
on using written notes to communicate with him while he was held overnight. Amy
Louise Kazmain, Deaf Man Gets $100,000 in Suit Against Police, L.A. TWMES, May
10, 1992, at J1.
Maine's statute, Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992-1993),
does not specifically require interpreters to be furnished upon arrest. Nevertheless,
that is the general practice, at least in southern Maine. Upon arrest, police contact an
interpreter referral agency such as Pine Tree Society Deaf Services, which sends two
interpreters, one of whom is often Deaf, to administer Miranda warnings. As an addi-
tional precaution, the warnings and the waiver are often videotaped. Interviews with
Douglas Newton, C.S.C., Program Director, Pine Tree Society Deaf Services, in Port-
land, Me. (Nov. 1992) and Polly Lawson, LC., T.C., C.L, Certified Interpreter, in
Portland, Me. (Nov. 1992).
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understand the proceedings. 5 Although many courts have referred to
the right to interpretation as having a basis in the Constitution, they
nonetheless fail to treat it as such.' By expecting defendants to se-
cure trial rights for themselves and by granting the trial court judges
broad discretion in ensuring these rights, appellate courts have al-
lowed deaf defendants' rights to fall below the constitutionally guar-
anteed minimum.
The increasing amount of legislation addressing the need for in-
terpretation has led many modern courts to focus on the statutory,
rather than the constitutional, requirements of the right to interpre-
tation.7 This approach usually results in less protection for deaf de-
fendants. These courts analyze the need for interpretation as a "spe-
cial right" for deaf people rather than viewing the statutes as
legislated procedures to ensure and protect, but not supplant, the
constitutional protection. The distinction between statutory and
constitutional rights is significant. For example, habeas corpus relief
for state court prisoners,8 requirements for waiver of a constitutional
right,9 and the standard of review in appellate courts0 all depend on
the characterization of the right as constitutional or statutory. The
need of deaf defendants for interpretation provides an unfortunate
example of how the failure to recognize the constitutional basis of
the right to interpretation has resulted in disparate treatment of de-
fendants in the courts. A recent Maine Supreme Judicial Court case,
State v. Green," reveals many of the problems deaf defendants face
in trial and appellate courts.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of some social, legal,
and cultural factors unique to the deaf population. These problems
and issues include the linguistic impact of deafness, the composition
5. See infra notes 147 and 152 for text of constitutional provisions.
6. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); People v.
Fleagle, 472 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989).
7. See, e.g., State v. Hammons, 771 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Green,
564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989).
8. Section 2254(a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
9. The Supreme Court has held that courts must make every reasonable pre-
sumption against finding a waiver of a constitutional right by a defendant, and any
such waiver must be done knowingly and competently. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
10. In order for a federal constitutional error to be found harmless, "the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
11. 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 263-86.
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of the deaf population, the use and structure of American Sign Lan-
guage (ASL), the quality of education of deaf children, and the spe-
cial difficulties facing those who have lost their hearing later in life.
This Comment maintains that, when courts do not recognize these
circumstances and related problems, the constitutional rights of deaf
criminal defendants are often compromised unintentionally. Part II
provides an overview of court decisions discussing the right to inter-
pretation. Part I outlines the sources of the constitutional right to
interpretation and demonstrates the application of general constitu-
tional principles to deaf defendants. Part IV discusses the current
statutes addressing interpretation in the courtroom and the short-
comings of those provisions. Part V sets forth the consequences of
the failure to recognize that the federal and state constitutions guar-
antee a right to interpretation. Finally this Comment concludes that
courts should facilitate, not block, enforcement of this right and rec-
ommends specific approaches that can eliminate unfair treatment of
deaf defendants in both trial and appellate courts.
I THE DEAF POPULATION IN AMERICA. ITS LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY
The legal system, for the most part, operates through hearing peo-
ple whose primary language is English. The vast majority of these
people (judges, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, clerks, and court person-
nel) have little or no contact with deaf people on a regular basis.
Protection of deaf people's rights is often compromised because of a
failure on the part of hearing people to understand and appreciate
their circumstances and problems. To understand the challenges
faced by deaf people in criminal settings, one must also examine and
consider the problems the deaf population faces as a whole. Specifi-
cally, being deaf in America has implications that go beyond an in-
ability to hear. It is to be part of a unique group considered by some
to be "disabled" and by others to be a linguistic minority.1 2 A deaf
educational administrator once commented: "Deafness is much
broader than just hearing loss; it is a complex sociopolitical reality
that permeates one's life."15 Analysis of the judicial decisions men-
tioned throughout this Comment will demonstrate that often it is
ignorance of this complex reality on the part of hearing people in
the judicial system, including defense counsel,'4 that results in a
compromise of deaf people's rights.
Foremost, the deaf population is not a monolith. The only com-
mon trait among its members is an inability to hear well enough to
12. HARLAN LANE, Ti MASK or BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF CoaMUNMY
(1992) examines the implications of each of these two views. See also Edward
Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, at 37.
13. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 5.
14. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (defendant's law-
yer unaware of client's severe hearing loss). See also infra note 200.
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understand spoken language, and even this similarity can vary in
degree. The problematic treatment of deaf people by legislatures
and courts stems from a basic failure to recognize the tremendous
diversity within the deaf population. This diversity is reflected in
the challenge of determining the size of the American deaf popula-
tion. The only study of the size of the deaf population was done in
1974. It estimated that there were 13,362,842 Americans with some
degree of deafness but characterized only two million people, one
percent of the United States population, as "profoundly deaf."
Moreover, the number of "prelingually" deaf adults (those who were
born deaf or lost most of their hearing prior to age three) was only
201,626.15
An important distinction is whether one is "Deaf' or "deaf." The
former term is used to describe members of the "Deaf community,"
a sub-group of the deaf population, while the latter indicates the
physiological condition of being unable to hear.16 The Deaf commu-
nity is the only group in America that has created an extensive cul-
ture based upon a physical characteristic. 17 Those within this com-
munity share several important bonds that set them apart from the
rest of the deaf population. The Deaf community has created not
only a unique language, ASL, but also a history, art, folklore, thea-
ter, and humor, separate and distinct from a culture based on Eng-
lish."8 Hearing people's ignorance and misunderstanding of these
bonds form their erroneous assumptions about Deaf people. For ex-
ample, many hearing people are surprised to learn the extent of
Deaf culture. There are a great number of social, political, and recre-
ational organizations on national, local, and even international
levels. The high degree of organization and complexity in this com-
munity is unique among groups identified as "disabled." 19
15. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 9. The Maine Department of Rehabilitation estimates
that there are approximately 70,000 "deaf or hard of hearing" Maine residents, 2,000
of whom are profoundly deaf. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, BUREAU OF REHABILITATION
(DIVISION OF DEAFNESS), INTERPRETING SERVICES IN MA1INE A REPORT BY THE STUDY
COMMITTEE ON INTERPRETING SERVICES (1989).
As will be shown in this Comment, the distinction between those born deaf and
those who lose their hearing later in life is critical in several ways, particularly since
many hearing people assume that the vast majority of deaf people have been deaf
since birth. If deaf adults have a strong ability to use spoken language, as is the case
with those who lost their hearing later in life, the assumption is often made by hear-
ing people that they do not experience significant hearing impairment.
16. This distinction was first made by James Woodward, a linguist at Gallaudet
University, according to CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES
FROM A CULTURE 2 (1988); see also SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
17. See SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 10-11.
18. JACK GANNON, DEAF HERITAGE. A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF DEAF AMERICA (1981)
provides an extensive catalog of two centuries of Deaf culture, including Deaf publi-
cations, Deaf athletes, and the National Theatre of the Deaf.
19. Dolnick, supra note 12, at 43.
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Without question, the most important bond among members of
the Deaf community is their language, ASL. From this language,
Deaf culture has blossomed. ASL is a visual language used by over a
half million Americans and Canadians." ASL is not inferior or
"slang" English expressed manually.21 The use of ASL is the single
most important factor in determining whether someone is a member
of the Deaf community.22 An anthropologist observed that the Deaf
community is a cultural group, not simply a group of people with a
common sensory deprivation, because the common adaptation to
that deprivation is the creation of a language.3 This culture and
community has emerged from deaf people's desire to communicate
and share experiences with others.2 '
Language is also at the center of the most critical legal and politi-
cal concerns of the Deaf community, including those concerns
presented in this Comment. For example, the "War of Methods,"
the controversy over whether deaf children should be taught in Eng-
lish, ASL, or some combination of both, has been the focus of debate
among deaf people, hearing professionals, and parents of deaf chil-
dren for over a century. On one side are members of the Deaf com-
munity and their hearing supporters who think deaf children should
be taught in ASL because it is the native language of the Deaf com-
munity and the method through which language is most easily
taught and comprehended.26 On the other side are "oralists," deaf
and hearing people who reject the use of ASL either in schools or
daily life and see it as "ghettoizing" deaf people and preventing as-
similation.27 This debate has spilled over into the legal system in the
context of interpreting the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).25 Another alternative method has arisen in the twenti-
eth century and joined the controversy- manually coded English sys-
20. CHARLOTTE BAKER & CAROL PADDEN, ASL: A LOOK AT ITS HISTORY. STRucTURE.
AND ComiuNrrY at 3 (1978).
21. ASL was not recognized as a "legitimate" language distinct from English in
academic circles until the 1960s. Jerome Schein attributes this recognition and ac-
ceptance as the reason the Deaf community is recognized as a "linguistic community"
and not a "disabled community." ScHN, supra note 1, at 39.
22. BAKER & PADDEN, supra note 20, at 5; ScHEN, supra note 1, at 11.
23. ScHEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
24. JoHN VICKREY VAN CLEvE & BARRY A. CROUCH, A PLACE OF THEIR OwN: CRE-
ATING THE DAF CoutUNIry IN AsmucA 106 (1989).
25. GANNON, supra note 18, at 359.
26. ScHm, supra note 1, at 136-41; LANE, supra note 12, at 129-43.
27. For a detailed history of the ongoing controversy in United States, see HARLAN
LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS: A HISTORY OF THE DEAF (1984).
28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (originally enacted as Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHC)). See DuBow ET AL, supra note 2, at
67; Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (finding that the EAHC Act does
not require a school to provide a deaf student with a sign language interpreter in a
mainstreaming setting).
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tems.29 One result of this debate is that not all members of the deaf
population who were born deaf or lost their hearing in childhood use
ASL.
These controversies about the education of deaf children have be-
come heated partly because the personal connections created within
the Deaf community during school years have lasting significance. A
study of the formation of the American Deaf community noted the
importance of the residential schools in Deaf history: "It was in the
residential schools that deaf Americans first met each other, devel-
oped a standard visual language, and discovered the common inter-
ests that presaged the formation of their community."30 In his study
of the dynamics of the American Deaf community, one sociologist
observed that deaf adults who were sent to state residential schools
for their education often identify these institutions, rather than
their current residence, as "where they are from."3 1 Although, at the
turn of the century, most deaf children attended residential schools,
the trend after the enactment of IDEA and the backlash against
ASL32 has been towards "mainstreaming" deaf children in public
schools. Today the majority of deaf children go to school with few, if
any, deaf children.3 3 Members of the Deaf community resist efforts
to close the old residential schools out of concern that mainstream-
ing will fracture the Deaf community if these educational bonds are
lost.3 4 This feeling, of course, is not a bond shared by deaf adults
who lost their hearing after they became adults.35 These cultural,
linguistic, and educational connections, therefore, not only set mem-
bers of the Deaf community apart from hearing culture but also re-
sult indirectly in the isolation of deaf people who do not share these
experiences, yet cannot move within the hearing community with
ease.
This Comment addresses the constitutional rights of both cultur-
29. See infra note 45.
30. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 24, at 171.
31. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 64.
32. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 24, at 106 (by the 1920s, 80 percent of deaf
students were educated without sign language or fingerspelling). See also LANE, supra
note 12, at 134, who reports that the current trend in deaf schools is the use of "total
communication" which employs a few ASL signs but does not use them with ASL
grammar or usage.
33. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 143.
34. LANE, supra note 12, at 139; SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 143. A former president
of the National Association of the Deaf and a "distinguished educator," Mervin D.
Garretson, has said that, "mainstreamed deaf children may find themselves cast
adrift without much of a self-identity because they are compelled to settle for half a
life in a hearing community that is only partially accessible to them." Id. This "par-
tial accessibility" also results in a lifetime of incomplete comprehension of spoken
language, including that used at criminal trials. See also Dolnick, supra note 12, at
43-44.
35. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 65.
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ally and non-culturally deaf people and will use the term "deaf' to
encompass both. Some articles and cases have focused entirely on
"Deaf' people and the right to ASL interpreters. "0 This Comment,
however, will also examine problems faced by those deaf adults who
are isolated from the Deaf community, as well as from hearing peo-
ple, since they are often most prejudiced by a lack of interpretation
of some kind.37 ASL interpretation is of no assistance to deaf people
who are not fluent in the language, but the dynamics and nature of
criminal proceedings limit the use of alternative forms of communi-
cation such as writing and speechreading3 8 Additionally, when the
term "interpretation" appears in this Comment, it is not limited to
the use of ASL interpreters. This term also encompasses any other
form of communication necessary to give a deaf person maximum
possible comprehension. Such alternative methods include oral in-
terpretation,39 assistive listening devices,' 0 and modern technological
systems such as the Computer Assisted Transcript (CAT), which al-
lows a deaf court participant to follow on a video monitor a verba-
tim written version of all testimony and remarks in court. 1
36. See, e.g., DuBow ET AL, supra note 2, at 172-89.
37. For example, according to Douglas Newton, Program Director of Pine Tree
Society Deaf Services, supra note 4, only a few police districts and court clerks in
southern Maine will immediately contact his agency for ASL interpretation when a
deaf or hard of hearing person in the court system is identified. For those deaf and
hard of hearing people in the outlying areas of Maine who attended public school and
never learned ASL, the problem is far worse, and Newton was unsure what happens
when such a person must appear in court. The appellate decisions reviewed for this
Comment suggest deaf persons without knowledge of ASL appear to have a dispro-
portionately high representation among deaf defendants claiming to have had inade-
quate interpretation at trial See, e.g., Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978);
People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d 109 (ilL 1970); State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62
(Me. 1989); Shook v. State, 552 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1989); Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d
687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Branson, 475 N.E.2d 905 (IlL App. Ct 1984); State
v. Gonzalez, 453 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Adams v. State, 749
S.W.2d 635 (Tex. CL App. 1988).
38. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
40. DuBow ET AL., supra note 2, at 10.
41. See Michele-Lee Berko, Comment, Preserving the Sixth Amendment Rights
of the Deaf Criminal Defendant, 97 DicK L REv. 101, 121 (1992). One of the first
uses of this system, also known as "real-time captioning," in Maine was in federal
district court in Bangor for a visiting judge who had lost his hearing. According to
Harry Hagopian, the official court reporter who operated the system, the judge was
"ecstatic" and commented, "Now I won't have to retire!" A similar system was used
for a deaf juror in Augusta but has not yet been used for a criminal defendant. Tele-
phone interview with Harry Hagopian, Co-Owner and President of Caption Technol-
ogy, Inc., Bangor, Maine (Mar. 11, 1993).
A deaf defendant in Houston, Texas was acquitted on retrial when a CAT was
used. In his previous trial he had been convicted without the use of an interpreter or
any other form of interpretation. The decision of the Court of Appeals of Texas, Ad-
ams v. State, 749 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. CL App. 1988) is discussed infra at text accompa-
nying notes 141-45 and 259-62. The defense attorney attributed the acquittal to the
1994]
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Another important distinguishing factor within the deaf popula-
tion affecting the ease of communication is the age at which an indi-
vidual lost her hearing. This factor has substantial impact on an in-
dividual's linguistic ability and interpretation needs. Sociologists
have identified "sub-categories" reflecting this distinction within the
deaf population. "Prelingually deaf" persons are those who lost their
hearing before age three42 and thus acquired little to no English
skills prior to that time. "Prevocationally deaf" adults lost their
hearing prior to completing their education.4 3 Seventy-five percent
of deaf Americans fall in neither sub-category, never learn to use
ASL and never participate in Deaf society;4 ' their lack of ASL skills
may lead to serious compromises of their rights. Interpretation stat-
utes often assume that the deaf person communicates through ASL
and that providing her with an ASL interpreter satisfies her commu-
nication needs. Clearly, for these deaf adults, another means of facil-
itating communication is necessary.
Although many deaf Americans do not use ASL, aspects of the
language and ASL interpretation demonstrate the shortcomings of
many modern statutes and the ignorance underlying some judicial
opinions. ASL is a language entirely distinct from English in syntax,
grammar, humor, idioms, and vocabulary. 4' It has a radically differ-
ent structure from English in that it conveys concepts visually
active participation of his client regarding the cross-examination of the victim. Marc
Charmatz, attorney for the National Association of the Deaf Legal Defense Fund said
of the acquittal, "This is one of the best illustrations of the need for assistance . . . to
go from guilty to not guilty when they use the proper equipment." Gary Taylor, Com-
puter Help Acquits Deaf Defendant; Preserving 6th Amendment Right, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 29, 1990, at 21.
A limit to the use of the this type of interpretation is demonstrated in a more
recent Texas case. In Brazell v. State, 828 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), another
Texas Appeals Court upheld the conviction of a deaf defendant who was allowed to
follow a simultaneous transcription during trial but argued on appeal that he had a
limited ability to read and had been too embarrassed at trial to admit this. Id. at 582.
After this Comment was prepared, the Comment by Michele-Lee Berko, supra, also
addressing the constitutional rights of deaf criminal defendants, was published.
Berko's Comment, however, has a different focus and provides a detailed examination
of the practical application of various methods of communication in criminal trials.
She concludes that sign language is the method through which a deaf criminal de-
fendant's rights can be best preserved. Berko, supra, at 130.
42. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 5, 9.
43. Id.
44. Brooke A. Masters, Sign Language: Can It Be Used Fairly in Court? Testi-
mony in Idiom of the Deaf Poses Problems for Interpreters, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
1992, at B1. This includes Americans who have lost the ability to understand spoken
language because of age. Older persons do, of course, comprise part of the criminal
defendant population.
45. The second half of the twentieth century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of
"manually coded English systems" such as "Signing Exact English." These are differ-
ent from ASL in that they use a word for word translation of English through manual
signs. GANNON, supra note 18, at 369-72.
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through manual signs, gestures, and facial expressions.' Further-
more, there is significant variation among users of ASL. Some deaf
people do not learn ASL until they become adults, either because
they did not lose their hearing as children, were educated in oralist
schools, or were mainstreamed in public schools. Although they use
ASL, these deaf people may never acquire ASL skills equal to those
of "native signers" who grew up using ASL during their social and
educational development.47 ASL can also vary by region and race.48
In addition to ignorance of the nature of ASL, hearing people
have other misconceptions about communicating with deaf people
that arise repeatedly in criminal cases and often lead to inadequate
protection of the deaf person's rights. For example, some hearing
people may assume that all or most deaf people, regardless of
whether they use ASL or know English, can "read lips."' 0 In fact,
the opposite is true. One study found that the best lipreaders (or
speechreaders) could fully comprehend only twenty-six percent of
what was said to them.50 Speechreading can supplement other forms
of communication but its usefulness depends largely on the proxim-
ity of the speaker, the speaker's style, and the addition of other vis-
ual cues to assist the deaf person.0 ' Also, speaking loudly, as many
hearing people do in the presence of deaf people, tends to distort lip
movements making it more difficult for the deaf person to
understand.2
46. ScHIN, supra note 1, at 35; see also PADDEN & HumpHUS, supra note 16, at
1.
47. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Mainstreaming is more of a threat
to the preservation of ASL than are oral residential programs largely because,
throughout the twentieth century, ASL flourished in residential schools as an under-
ground language passed on by older children and was used out of the presence of the
hearing educators. Deaf children educated without other deaf people as classmates or
teachers do not have the same opportunity to learn and use the language.
An example in a legal setting can demonstrate the degree of difference among some
users of ASL. The defendant in State v. Mason, 633 P.2d 820 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (see
supra note 4) received "some oral or lip reading training in school, but no training in
sign language until the age of 14." Id. at 826 n.3. An expert witness at the hearing
seeking an order to suppress statements he made to police described that Mason's
ASL level was that of "baby talk." Id. It does not appear that he understood written
or spoken English.
48. ScH m, supra note 1, at 29-30.
49. Of course, "lipreading" also presupposes a person's knowledge of the language
being spoken.
50. DuBow Fr AL., supra note 2, at 6 (citing McCAY VENoN & EUGENE D.
MINDEL, THEY GROW IN SILENcE: THE DEA" CHILD AND HIs FALuLY 96 (1971)). A study
in Great Britain demonstrated that, even after ten years of "oral" education, most
deaf students were not better at lipreading than "a man in the street .... " Lots,
supra note 12, at 129.
51. See DuBow Er AL., supra note 2, at 7. See also Berko, supra note 41, at 109-10
for a discussion of additional factors limiting the use of speechreading as an effective
form of communication.
52. People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Sup. CL 1984).
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Courtroom trials provide an excellent example of the limitations
of speechreading. The speaker is usually quite far from the deaf de-
fendant and, in the case of an attorney, may be turned away from
the defendant when examining witnesses or addressing the jury.
When objections are made, two, sometimes three, persons may
speak at once. The courtroom setting and decorum eliminate many
visual cues used by deaf people who speechread. The use of legal
terms and other words unfamiliar to lay persons can further limit
understanding. For example, the professional jargon of police of-
ficers, medical examiners, and psychiatrists contain many words and
phrases that would be incomprehensible to one who is speechread-
ing. Further, people who testify are often instructed by attorneys to
remain "composed" and to speak with as little emotion and ges-
turing as possible. Many responses to cross-examination consist of
only "yes" or "no" and, unless the deaf person was able to under-
stand the question, the answer will be meaningless to him or her.
Many deaf people who have some residual hearing rely on speech-
reading and amplification (hearing aids) for comprehension of spo-
ken language. Hearing aids have their own drawbacks and limita-
tions, however. Their effectiveness depends largely on the type and
degree of hearing loss and the nature of the surroundings during
their use. Background noise or the acoustics of a particular room, for
example, can render them totally useless in some cases.5 3 Addition-
ally, some hearing people mistakenly assume that deaf persons have
near-perfect hearing when they wear a hearing aid.
It is also important to recognize the inadequacy of writing as a
substitute for ASL or other interpretation. People, hearing or deaf,
tend to condense what they would say in other modes when they are
writing notes, which could be extremely prejudicial in legal settings.
Moreover, English is a second language to most deaf people who lost
their hearing during childhood. Given the poor quality of educa-
tional opportunities for most deaf children in this country, deaf
adults, on average, have reading levels far below that of hearing
adults,54 thus greatly limiting comprehension of this form of com-
Also, courts' opinions often appear to rest on the belief that it is acceptable for deaf
people to have less than full comprehension even when the means to better compre-
hension are readily available. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
In Rowley, the Court's denial of a deaf child's right to an interpreter in public school
under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act was based on the claim that
she was already receiving "adequate education," although the uncontroverted evi-
dence showed that the child understood less than half of what was said in the class-
room without an interpreter. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting). The question may be
asked whether the defendant's participation in his own trial is less important than
that of the other participants. For example, would a judge allow the proceedings to be
only partly comprehensible to him or her?
53. See DuBow ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
54. SACKS, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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munication. Studies estimate that the average American deaf six-
teen-year-old reads at the same level as the average hearing eight-
year-old, and that eighty-five percent of profoundly deaf people can-
not read a newspaper when they complete their education.,s Com-
puter Assisted Transcript systems, however, can be a useful inter-
pretation tool for non-ASL fluent defendants with a minimum level
of literacy.
The role of interpreters and interpretation takes on enormous im-
portance due to the complex and unusual communication needs of
deaf people. Several types of interpreters facilitate communication
between deaf and hearing people.56 The most common type is an
interpreter who uses ASL, translating from ASL to English and vice
versa. There are also "oral interpreters" for deaf people, who rely on
speechreading to understand spoken words. Oral interpreters sit in
front of the deaf person and silently mouth the speaker's words,
substituting words that are easier to speechread.57 Also, intermedi-
ary interpreters (usually Deaf persons themselves) translate ASL
from a person who is signing or interpreting into a simpler form of
ASL for deaf people with lower ASL skills or who use a visual-ges-
tural system.5"
Many professional interpreters are certified by the Registry of In-
terpreters for the Deaf (RID), a national professional organization.,)
To be certified one must have a high level of ASL proficiency (in-
cluding an ability to interpret from ASL to English) as well as an
understanding of ethical and cultural issues involved in interpreting
for deaf and hearing people.60 In the absence of certification, it is
difficult for hearing people, including trial court judges, to assess the
skills of an interpreter. 1 RID also provides specialized certification
for legal interpreting requiring additional training in substantive
and procedural legal issues.62 An additional factor in interpreting,
55. LANE, supra note 12, at 130-31.
56. See DuBow ET AL, supra note 2, at 2-3. This discussion centers on the types
of professional interpreters. Of course, most deaf people who need interpretation to
communicate with hearing people rely on non-professional interpreters such as fam-
ily, friends, and, occasionally, strangers who happen to be available. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 2. See also Berko, supra note 41, at 111-12.
58. DuBow ET AL, supra note 2, at 2. See also discussion of People v. Rivera, 480
N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984), infra at text accompanying notes 130-40.
59. DuBow ET AL., supra note 2, at 2-3. According to Hagopian, supra note 41, the
National Association of Court Reporters is developing a training and certification
program for real time captioning.
60. DuBow ET Ai., supra note 2, at 2-4; Interviews with Douglas Newton and Polly
Lawson, supra note 4.
61. Schein mentions that a court's inability to judge the competence of an inter-
preter results in many problems for deaf people in the court system, ScHMN, supra
note 1, at 185. Deaf people themselves are the best authorities on the quality of indi-
vidual interpreters. DuBow ET AL, supra note 2, at 3.
62. DuBow Er Ai., supra note 2, at 3; Interviews with Douglas Newton, supra note
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with added significance in legal settings, is the RID Code of Ethics,
which must be followed by all RID certified interpreters. Included as
part of this code is thoroughness, accuracy, s and confidential-
ity. 4 Non-certified interpreters (especially those who are acquainted
with one of the parties) could severely compromise the accuracy of
the testimony. 5 Despite the importance of having certified inter-
preters available for legal and other settings, the number of certified
interpreters is very low.6" Currently, there are only fourteen certified
interpreters in Maine, not all of whom have the skills required to
interpret in legal settings.67
Special considerations apply when interpreting in criminal de-
fense contexts. Defense attorneys require the use of an interpreter in
pretrial preparations particularly if they are going to use an inter-
preter during trial. 8 Interpreting between two distinct languages
that often do not share identical concepts or words is itself a formi-
dable undertaking,6 9 and courtroom interpreting presents its own set
4.
63. DuBow T AL., supra note 2, at 4. See also United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d
436, 439 (1st Cir. 1986) in which the trial court judge chastised a Spanish-language
interpreter for translating a pro se defendant's statements as well as his questions
during his cross-examination of a witness. If this were a RID interpreter and deaf
defendant, the judge would be asking her to violate the RID ethical rules, which re-
quire complete interpretation of every word.
64. DuBow Er AL., supra note 2, at 4. In addition, Maine has enacted a statute to
protect interpreters from being required to disclose communications unless such dis-
closure is deemed absolutely necessary by the presiding judge. ME. REV. STAT, ANN.
tit. 5, § 48(4) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
65. The expert witness who testified in People v. Rivera discussed the tendency of
some interpreters to "parent," filling in some of the answers or changing words as
they believe will benefit the defendant. 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Sup. Ct. 1984). During
testimony, of course, changing a word or two can have a significant impact. Addition-
ally, use of a non-certified interpreter who knows a party can also raise the question
of interpreter bias. See State v. Doucette, 398 A.2d 36 (Me. 1978); Urqhardt v. Lock-
hart, 726 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1984) (both cases affirming conviction when defendants
alleged interpreter bias on the part of ASL interpreter for prosecution witness).
66. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 197-98.
67. Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4. There is only one certified in-
terpreter for approximately every 167 deaf Maine residents. What is even more com-
pelling is the importance placed on certification by those who rely on interpreters. A
poll of deaf persons and employers, educators, and interpreters for the deaf in Maine
indicated that over 80 percent expressed the "importance of certification of interpret-
ers." Only 10 percent indicated that they had no preference for the certification sta-
tus of an interpreter with whom they were working, and only 7 percent were satisfied
with the services of non-certified interpreters in the state. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, BUREAU OF REHABILITATION (DIVISION OF DEAFNESS), INTERPRETING SERVICES
IN MAINE: A REPORT BY THE STUDY COMMITTEE ON INTERPRETING SERVICES (1989).
68. Deaf defendants who obtain interpreting services through Pine Tree Society
Deaf Services in Portland, Maine are usually able to have use of the same interpreter
for both pretrial preparations and the trial itself. Interview with Douglas Newton,
supra note 4.
69. For example, there is no exact equivalent for the concepts of "legal rights" or
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of challenges. During trial, all proceedings must be interpreted in-
cluding attorneys' arguments, statements to and from the bench,
and the examination of all witnesses. Interference with the interpre-
tation results when a person speaks at the same time as another, or
blocks the interpreter with use of exhibits or body positions.7 0 More
difficult to guard against are the cultural differences between hear-
ing and deaf people. For example, ASL incorporates many nonverbal
behaviors that have different connotations to hearing people. Ameri-
can society often regards "exaggerated" gesturing or facial expres-
sions as "vulgar," whereas the opposite is true in deaf culture.
1
These differences can affect the jurors' evaluation of a deaf person's
credibility or criminal responsibility.
Another problem can be the cultural norm among many deaf peo-
ple of nodding. Such nodding does not necessarily indicate agree-
ment or approval but rather that someone is paying attention.7 2
When a deaf person is nodding but the word "No" is interpreted,
the jury's faith in the credibility of both the witness and interpreter
"appeal" in ASL. Larry J. Goldberg, The Law: From Shield to Sword for Deaf Peo-
ple, 9 HuzsN RIGms 22, 25 (1980). The fact that there are concepts which do not
translate exactly from ASL to English is not an indication of any inferiority of ASL
but is a common occurrence in the case of two languages with different origins. These
differences are compounded by the fact that ASL is an entirely visual language using
specific facial expressions as well as individual signs to convey meaning, tone, and
emphasis. Differences between the two languages temper many verbal techniques
used by attorneys during examination to control and focus questioning, such as
phrasing questions in double negatives. Brooke A. Masters, Sign Language: Can It Be
Used Fairly in Court? Testimony in Idiom of the Deaf Poses Problems for Interpret-
ers, WAsLa PosT, Oct. 13, 1992, at B1.
70. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 25.
71. ScHmN, supra note 1, at 35. For example, the sign for "you" or "her" in ASL
consists of "pointing" to the person to whom one is referring; in American culture
pointing to someone is considered impolite. Douglas Newton and other interpreters
will usually suggest a pretrial meeting among the parties, counsel, and judge to dis-
cuss these differences and how they can be minimized during a civil or criminal trial
Newton urges judges to explain these differences to jury members so that they do not
use hearing standards of behavior when observing a deaf person's testimony and eval-
uating its credibility. Newton nonetheless believes that even with these cautionary
explanations, hearing juries appear to react negatively to the use of ASL in a trial
Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4.
The cultural differences between hearing and deaf people raise the question of
whether a deaf defendant must always be adjudged guilty or not by all.hearing juries.
The law is in a state of flux over this issue. Usually the cases are brought by hearing
defendants who are challenging the selection of a deaf juror. See, eg., United States
v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding conviction where one juror
was deaf).
72. In People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984), discussed infra at notes
130-40 and accompanying text, an expert witness also noted that, "in stress situa-
tions, hearing-impaired persons may attempt to diffuse perceived hostility by assum-
ing an acquiescent emotional posture. This often takes the form of nodding affirma-
tively in response to a question that the person does not understand." Id. at 429.
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may decrease. s Also, a deaf person who is a party may observe a
witness' testimony and nod throughout, while wholeheartedly dis-
agreeing with it.
Courts too easily assume they have met a deaf person's interpreta-
tion needs. A closer examination of the facts involved in the deci-
sions discussed herein, however, reveals the erroneous reliance upon
speechreading, note-writing, and amplification. The failure of trial
court judges and defense attorneys to address the factors outlined
above has allowed the rights of defendants to be compromised in
trial settings. This problem, however, as discussed in the following
sections, is further compounded by vague statutory requirements
and enormous discretion accorded by appellate courts to trial court
actions in appointing interpreters.
I. OVERVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO INTERPRETATION
A few state and federal courts have recognized interpretation as a
constitutional right of deaf defendants based upon the United
States and state constitutions. A larger number of courts purport to
connect the right to interpretation with the basic trial rights of de-
fendants but fail to enforce this right with the same vigilance as
other constitutional protections, such as the right to counsel. The
following section examines many of these cases.
A. Federal Courts
Many constitutional principles trace their source to an opinion or
line of cases from the United States Supreme Court 4 Unfortu-
nately, the Court has never directly addressed the impact of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments on the rights of deaf criminal
defendants to have proceedings interpreted, leaving the develop-
ment of the case law entirely to lower federal courts and the individ-
ual states. However, there are two early cases in which the Court
addressed related issues. In a 1906 case, Felts v. Murphy,7 the
Court upheld a circuit court denial of a deaf state prisoner's habeas
corpus petition. In Felts, the trial court denied the defendant's re-
quest that the proceedings be repeated into his ear trumpet.7 0 Al-
though there was no question that the defendant did not hear a
word of the entire trial (with the exception of the one sentence
which was repeated into his trumpet), the Court found no due pro-
73. Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4.
74. Several examples of the origins of the trial rights of criminal defendants are
provided in Part III infra.
75. 201 U.S. 123 (1906).
76. An ear trumpet is a trumpet-shaped device held to the ear to amplify sound.
It is now obsolete, having been replaced by hearing aids and other amplification
devices.
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cess violation and upheld the conviction.7 Also, in Perovich u.
United States,78 decided the following year, the Court granted
broad discretion to a trial court judge in the matter of whether to
appoint an interpreter to translate the non-English-speaking de-
fendant's testimony, allowing him to testify in his native and
stronger language. 9
This deference to trial court judges on matters of language inter-
pretation during trial continues in federal courts today.80 However,
given the extensive case law development on the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments since Felts and Perovich, it is doubtful that the
Court would decide such egregious cases the same way today. Given
the development in the second half of this century of the jurispru-
dence of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, conclu-
sions such as those in Felts and Perovich are inconsistent with the
fundamental principles that have emerged.81 The Supreme Court
has had numerous occasions in recent years to comment on the issue
of interpretation at trial, particularly in the area of federal courts
and the Federal Court Interpreters Act, but has denied certiorari on
every occasion.8 2 The result is that the only cases from the Court on
the issue of interpretation are nearly a century old and inconsistent
with modem jurisprudence on defendants' federal constitutional
rights.
In contrast, several lower federal courts have addressed the issue
of the right to interpretation in the context of defendants who are
deaf or whose primary language is not English. The leading case on
interpretation under the United States Constitution, United States
ex rel. Negron v. New York,83 involved a Spanish-speaking defend-
ant.' Regelio Nieves Negron petitioned a federal district court for
77. Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. at 130-31.
78. 205 U.S. 86 (1907).
79. Id. at 91.
80. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 215-47.
81. See infra, Part HI of this Comment for an outline of Supreme Court cases
regarding the importance of the defendant's presence at trial and competence.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488, (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 2055 (1991); United States v. Gomez, 908 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 699 (1991); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (l1th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied sub nom. Panchal v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 523 (1990); United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub norm Estevez v. United
States, 492 U.S. 908 (1989); United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436 (ist Cr. 1990),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); Carrion v. United States, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974).
83. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970) (Retired United States Supreme Court Justice
Clark sat on the unanimous panel).
84. Many cases in the development of the law on the right to interpretation did
not involve deaf defendants. The similarities between the treatment of deaf and other
non-English speaking persons outweigh the potential differences for the purposes of
the analysis here. Deaf people, like other linguistic minorities, do not use English, for
the most part, as a "native" or "first" language. Both groups are hampered by a lack
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habeas corpus relief after a state court conviction of second degree
murder.8 5 He spoke no English and was unable to communicate with
his attorney until twenty minutes prior to trial when an interpreter
was made available. During trial, the interpreter translated the
Spanish testimony of the defendant and witnesies for the benefit of
the English-speaking persons present. She did not, however, trans-
late the remainder of the proceedings into Spanish for Negron and
provided only a few "summaries" of the testimony during recesses.
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and the state
appealed.86
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed and held that Negron's trial "lacked the basic and funda-
mental fairness required by the Due Process Clause. '87 It found the
source of Negron's constitutional protection in the Due Process
Clause's incorporation of the Sixth Amendment guarantees of con-
frontation of prosecution witnesses, presence at trial, and compe-
tency to stand trial. Without translation, the court reasoned, "[t]he
adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction. .. .
The court rejected the state's argument that Negron had waived his
right to an interpreter. Applying the United States Supreme Court's
definition of waiver in Johnson v. Zerbst,89 the court concluded that
the defendant could not be deemed to have intentionally relin-
quished a known right or privilege, especially when there was no in-
dication that he knew he had such a right and the right was "ill-
defined." 0 Moreover, since the law on the right to interpretation
of accessible communication to persons in the court system but in both cases, for the
most part, communication can be facilitated by interpretation.
It is likely, however, that there are other factors that separate the treatment of deaf
people from that of other linguistic minorities, largely due to many misconceptions
held by hearing people about deaf people. For example, it may be difficult to imagine
that an individual who was born in and grew up in the United States among English-
speaking people knows little to no English. Likewise, it may be hard to recognize that
someone who speaks English has little ability to understand it in return, as is the case
for some deaf adults who lost their hearing later in life. While other non-English
speaking people encounter racism and xenophobia from the majority culture, deaf
people may encounter condescension and intimidation.
85. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 387-88.
86. Id. at 388.
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id. (quoting Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 458
(1969)).
89. 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (holding that waiver of a constitutional right must
be done knowingly and competently and courts should make every reasonable pre-
sumption against finding such a waiver).
90. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 390. Waiver is a critical
issue in many of these cases and it is where many courts fail to apply correct consti-
tutional analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 324-28. Waiver of a known right
is a salient point* for deaf persons in two respects. First, for example, many deaf peo-
ple and their supporters in Maine are unaware of the right to interpretation in ME.
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was unsettled, his attorney could not have anticipated its effect on
appeal.91 Rather than granting broad discretion to the trial court's
inaction, the court held that the judge had a duty to make it "un-
mistakably clear to [the defendant] that he has a right to have a
competent translator assist him, at state expense if need be,
throughout his trial.19 2 Unfortunately few circuit courts have made
such unequivocal statements, even since the passage of the Federal
Court Interpreters Act, which was intended to codify Negron . 3
Federal courts have addressed the right to interpretation in deaf
defendants' appeals as well. An early Eighth Circuit case,
Mothershead v. King,94 granted a deaf defendant his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus relief when he was denied his constitutional
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment by a state court conviction
without the assistance of either an interpreter or an attorney.- The
court held: "The conviction of a person whose infirmities are such
that he cannot understand or comprehend the proceedings . . . is
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992-1993). Maine's Bureau of Reha-
bilitation, Division of Deafness, conducted polls during a series of public hearings
held throughout the state on interpreter services. A total of 94 people participated in
the polls from hearings in Bangor, Auburn and Portland; 60 percent were hearing
impaired, 19 percent were interpreters, and the remainder were educators, employers,
and service providers. Only 23 percent of this group, arguably the most knowledgea-
ble in the state on the status of deaf persons, were familiar with the Maine law on
interpreting services for the Deaf/Hearing Impaired. In Bangor none were familiar.
DEPARTiMENT OF HuMAN SERVICES. BUREAU OF REHABILITATION (DIVIsiON OF DEAmNss),
INTERPRETING SERVICES IN MAINE A REPORT BY THE STUDY CoiMTnE ON INMERPRET-
ING SERVICES (1989). This is not to condemn this group for not knowing the law, but
only to point out that, like most of us, members of the Deaf community cannot in-
stantly recite their rights. The court interpreter statute is not one that a defense
attorney is likely to encounter during practice, given the small number of arrests of
deaf persons.
The second implication of a waiver requirement for deaf people is the fact that, due
to the very small number of interpreters, most of whom are concentrated in southern
Maine, most deaf people are used to "getting by" without full interpretation. In gen-
eral, requests for interpretation usually go unmet, even where federal law requires
interpretation. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 192-93. It is the Author's personal observa-
tion (of Deaf people in Philadelphia) that eventually many deaf people simply stop
asking.
91. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 390.
92. Id. at 391.
93. The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Report indicates that
An original impetus for legislation ... was the 1970 decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Negron v. New York
. . . which held that the sixth amendment to the Constitution requires that
non-English speaking defendants be informed of their right to simultaneous
interpretation of the proceedings at government expense.
H-R REP. No. 1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N.
4652, 4653.
94. 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940).
95. Id. at 1005.
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violative of certain immutable principles of justice."' 6
The most extensive discussion by a federal court of the constitu-
tional aspects of the right to interpretation for deaf defendants,
however, was in the 1978 Fifth Circuit case, Ferrell v. Estelle . 7 Fer-
rell is important not only because it outlines the constitutional basis
of the right to interpretation, but because it involved an additional
challenge for the trial court: the deaf defendant could not communi-
cate using ASL. Ferrell, like Negron, was a state prisoner seeking
habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. The state trial court de-
nied his motion for simultaneous transcription by a stenographer
and instead allowed for frequent recesses to confer with defense
counsel." His attorney, however, made such requests on only two
occasions. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit agreed
that the rights to confront prosecution witnesses and assist in one's
own defense were compromised in this case. The language barrier
was not easily remedied since an ASL interpreter was not useful.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals did not excuse the trial judge from
failing to protect these rights. It concluded that "[e]nsuring that the
defendant has that minimum understanding [to be able to assist in
his own defense] is primarily the task of the trial judge,"99 and
based this conclusion upon "the constitutional principles" outlined
in Negron.10 0 The court found that the "Constitution does not re-
quire that every defendant comprehend the English language with
the precision of a Rhodes Scholar . . .," and also allowed for a
"basic balancing" of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
against "the public's interest in the administration of criminal
law."'1 2 The court suggested that this "balancing" required the trial
court to find a method of interpretation that was both helpful to the
defendant and not disruptive to hearing participants.0 3 It rejected
simultaneous transcription as potentially impairing the defendant's
ability to present his case. Nonetheless, the court held that, if no
other option could be found, this "least attractive device" must be
used, regardless of inconvenience or expense.10 4
96. Id. at 1006 (paraphrasing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1934), which
referred to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
97. 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978), opinion withdrawn after defendant died, 573
F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1978).
98. Id. at 1129-30. The defendant had recently lost his hearing after he was in-
jured in a police "shoot-out," and he communicated through reading and speaking.
Id.
99. Id. at 1132.
100. Id. at 1131.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1131-32.
103. Id. at 1132.
104. Id. at 1132-33. It should be noted that the technology involved in simultane-
ous transcription, now also known as CAT or "real time captioning," see supra note
41, has improved greatly only in the last four years or so. Today's systems allow for
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Few federal courts impose the same degree of responsibility on
trial court judges to determine a mode of communication for a deaf
defendant as did the Ferrell court. The current federal case law on
interpretation is influenced largely by a First Circuit case, United
States v. Carrion,105 decided five years before Ferrell but not men-
tioned in the Ferrell opinion. The Carrion court upheld the convic-
tion of a "foreign born national with a limited ability to speak and
comprehend English."10 The opinion acknowledged that language
barriers can result in impairment of confrontation rights and the
ability to take the stand in one's own defense. According to the
court, "[t]he right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally, how-
ever, on the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque
spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in pun-
ishment. °1 0 7 However, after this declaration the court retreated and
granted enormous discretion to trial court judges to decide when an
interpreter is necessary based upon such considerations as complex-
ity of issues and testimony, "the language ability of the defendant's
counsel," and "considerations of judicial economy."10 Ultimately
near-instantaneous transmission of the information to deaf people and are entirely
unobtrusive to the conduct of the trial. Interview with Harry Hagopian, id.
105. 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974).
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id.
108. Id. There may be some argument that the actual language and hearing abili-
ties of a defendant are "findings of fact" that should be reversed only if they are
clearly erroneous, but in the area of constitutional protection, these fact/law distinc-
tions are far from clear. For example, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), Chief
Justice Burger quoted Justice Frankfurter's discussion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 51 (1949):
But "issue of fact" is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclusion
drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion incorporates
standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are deci-
sive of constitutional rights. Such standards and criteria, measured against
the requirements drawn from constitutional provisions, and their proper
applications, are issues for this court's adjudication.... Especially in cases
arising under the Due Process Clause it is important to distinguish between
issues of fact that are here foreclosed and issues which, though cast in the
form of determinations of fact, are the very issues to review for which this
Court sits.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 175 n.10. Also, in none of the dozens of cases of deaf
and other non-English-speaking minorities reviewed for this Comment was an expert
witness produced at trial or in pre-trial proceedings on either side to demonstrate the
actual language and/or hearing ability of a defendant. Instead, courts typically rely on
usually incorrect sources such as their own impressions and those of other court per-
sonnel Two cases where expert testimony was introduced during post-trial proceed-
ings provide compelling demonstrations of the prejudice to defendant that can result
from courts' failure to ascertain defendants' hearing impairment In People v. Ri-
vera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984), Rivera's own attorney in the original trial
believed that "[Rivera] appeared to understand the proceeding" but an audiologist
who tested the defendant testified that the results showed a "severe to profound sen-
sori-neural hearing impairment [in both ears], which ... renders him incapable of
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the court upheld the conviction of a defendant, whose English skills
were admittedly "limited."' 0 9
Unfortunately, the approach of modern federal courts has more
resembled Carrion than Ferrell and Negron. Some federal courts
have adopted a mutation of the "basic balancing" principle men-
tioned in Ferrell but have used it to deny new trials or habeas
corpus petitions. A Fifth Circuit panel, which differed from that de-
ciding Ferrell two years earlier, upheld the conviction of a Spanish-
speaking defendant using a markedly different analysis from that in
Ferrell."10 The case, United States v. Martinez, employed a "test"
that combined those used in Carrion and Ferrell. The court upheld
the conviction of a defendant whose defense counsel offered to serve
as an interpreter after being informed by the court that "since [the
defendant] had employed counsel the court was not required to pro-
vide an interpreter for him.""' The court reasoned that the use of
interpreters "involves a balancing of the defendant's constitutional
rights to confrontation and due process against the public's interest
in the economical administration of criminal law. . . . That balanc-
ing is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge, reversible
only on a showing of abuse."11 2 Ferrell, however, made no specific
reference to fiscal considerations. The Ferrell court did discuss the
expense and inconvenience of simultaneous transcription but held
that if no other option is available to provide interpretation, it must
be used.11 ' Interestingly, Martinez has been cited in other circuits as
an authoritative discussion of the constitutional aspects of interpre-
tation rights."'
understanding normal speech." Id. at 428. In Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988), the judge who presided over the original trial testified at the defendant's
motion for a new trial that he "felt there was no need to appoint an interpreter. The
judge observed [the defendant] throughout trial, particularly his testimony while on
the stand, and felt that he understood the proceedings." Id. at 689. An audiologist,
however, testified that Peeler also had "severe to profound" hearing loss in both ears.
He could not understand spoken English except under ideal conditions and using
visual cues; neither were present at trial. Id. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 397 n.4 (1977) ("Whether [defendant] waived his constitutional rights was not, of
course, a question of fact, but an issue of federal law.").
109. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14-15.
110. United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 187 (citation omitted). The trial took place after the passage of the
Federal Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827 (West Supp. 1993), but just prior
to its effective date; the statute requires federal courts to provide interpreter services
to all who require them, regardless of income. See also infra note 340 and accompany-
ing text for the implications of the constitutional right and who is required to pay.
112. Id. at 188.
113. Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978).
114. See, e.g., Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1141 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Luna v.
Black, 772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985) (following Carrion in granting trial court
wide discretion, and finding that no right to interpretation exists if no need is deter-
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Most federal courts, following Carrion and Martinez, therefore,
have regarded the right to interpretation as having a "quasi-consti-
tutional" level of significance. While courts recognize a connection
between the need for translation and other constitutional rights,
they are unwilling to take the necessary steps at trial or on review to
enforce these rights in a meaningful way. Using such an analysis,
appellate courts confronted with issues of interpretation explicitly
allow a balancing of constitutional rights against notions of "eco-
nomical administration of justice" and grant broad discretion to
trial court judges over matters about which they have limited infor-
mation and resources. It can be argued, however, that the strength
of constitutional protections is precisely their mandatory applica-
tion, regardless of inconvenience or expense. This uncompromising
nature has been the foundation of criminal justice for over two hun-
dred years, without amendment. Furthermore, courts often fail in
these cases to recognize exactly which underlying principles are be-
ing "balanced," such as the right to communication with counsel,
confrontation of defense witnesses, and presence at trial. It is
unimaginable, for instance, that a criminal defendant's right to a
jury trial could be denied because it was less expensive to have a
bench trial.
B. State Courts
The state court decisions on the scope of a deaf criminal defend-
ant's right to interpretation at trial have varied widely throughout
this century. As Part IV will address, an increasing number of state
court decisions are based upon statutory requirements for interpre-
tation. Frequently, an analysis of the constitutional requirements is
marginal or absent. Although some states have applied a constitu-
tional, as well as statutory, analysis, they have done so without una-
nimity on what the rights and responsibilities of the defendant and
trial court involve.115
Terry v. State,"' a 1925 Alabama case, was among the earliest
cases that addressed this issue, and remains one of the most une-
quivocal statements on the constitutional aspects of interpretation.
In Terry, the court based the right to interpretation on the Alabama
state constitution's guarantees of a right to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation and to confront prosecution witnesses."'
mined and no request is made).
U5. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has never di-
rectly addressed the issue of the constitutional dimension of the right to interpreta-
tion. As will be discussed infra notes 263-86 and accompanying text, the court had an
opportunity to do so in State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989), but did not settle the
question.
116. 105 So. 386 (Ala. 1925).
117. Id. at 387.
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Over the defense counsel's objections, the trial court repeatedly re-
fused to appoint an interpreter in a deaf man's trial. The Alabama
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and wrote:
In the absence of an interpreter it would be a physical impossibil-
ity for the accused, a deaf-mute, to know or to understand the na-
ture and cause of the accusation against him, and .. .he could
only stand by helplessly .. . and all this in the teeth of the
mandatory constitutional rights which apply to an unfortunate af-
flicted deaf-mute, just as it does to every person accused of a viola-
tion of the criminal law.1 8
A 1982 Alabama case, however, indicated a retreat from Terry. In
Turner v. State,119 the appeal involved a deaf defendant who was
arraigned without an interpreter. When the trial court addressed the
defendant orally during the arraignment, the defendant responded
by nodding. This was considered by the trial and appellate courts to
be an adequate waiver although there was no showing that the de-
fendant actually understood the judge's explanation. 120 The appel-
late court noted that, although appointment of interpreters is "cer-
tainly the recommended procedure," there was no constitutional
violation based upon the "factual findings' 12 1 that the defendant
nodded and "[could] communicate, at least to some degree, by writ-
ing."' 2 As discussed in Part II,"'3 nodding is not necessarily an af-
firmative response among deaf people, and writing may be an inade-
quate form of communication.
In People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs,"24 the Supreme Court of Illinois
required trial court judges to provide deaf defendants "reasonable
facilities" to protect their constitutional rights. 25 In People v.
Fleagle,2 6 however, an Illinois intermediate appellate court held
that the "reasonable facilities" requirement of Myers could be met
by allowing defense counsel to repeat all testimony to the defendant,
speaking loudly and slowly so that the defendant could "read his
lips. 1' 2 Both Turner and Fleagle provide examples of the special
problems faced by non-ASL fluent deaf people played out in the fo-
rum of the criminal justice system. Ferrell also involved a non-ASL
118. Id. at 387-88.
119. 429 So. 2d 645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
120. Id. at 647.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 646.
123. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
124. 263 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. 1970). See discussion of this case infra notes 178-80 and
accompanying text.
125. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
126. 472 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
127. Id. at 160. See discussion of "lipreading" supra at text accompanying notes
49-52.
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fluent defendant, 28 yet the court demonstrated an unwavering ap-
plication of constitutional principles that was absent from both of
these state court cases. The result in cases like Turner and Fleagle
is that convictions were upheld when the "communication" with the
accused occurred entirely through note-writing or attempts at
speechreading when more comprehensive means should have been
used. Such cases occur because many state appellate courts do im-
pose a constitutional obligation on the trial court to make not the
best effort, but only a bare attempt, in facilitating the defendants'
understanding of the proceedings.
29
In contrast, two recent cases prove that courts can take a more
responsible, comprehensive, and constitutionally sound approach. In
People v. Rivera20 and Adams v. State,'3' the courts not only recog-
nized the constitutional right to interpretation, aside from any stat-
utory guarantees, but also closely scrutinized the actions of the trial
court. In Rivera, the defense counsel was clearly knowledgeable
about deaf issues and sought to educate the trial court.132 The court,
in turn, examined the deaf defendant's individual needs rather than
making assumptions from the bench about the adequacy of interpre-
tation. The procedural posture was as unusual as was the court's
attention to these issues; the defendant pleaded guilty to grand lar-
ceny in the third degree, but moved to contest sentencing as a "sec-
ond felony offender" because his two prior convictions were ob-
tained in trials in which his due process rights were denied by
inadequate interpretation. The Supreme Court of New York, Crimi-
nal Term, held a fact-finding hearing and ultimately granted the
motion. The judge noted that the defendant had relatively low skills
in ASL and that a deaf interpreter 33 had assisted in trial prepara-
tion and was present at the evidentiary hearing on the motion. The
defendant was able to speak Spanish (only a Spanish language inter-
preter was provided at the first hearing), but was unable to under-
128. Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978). In the state court deci-
sion in Ferrell, Ferrell v. Texas, 479 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals demonstrated the prejudice to non-ASL fluent defendants.
The court upheld the trial court's refusal to order simultaneous transcription because
of the inconvenience and expense and concluded the opinion with the statement:
"This case is distinguishable from those involving deaf-mutes . .. where virtually
instant transcription may be provided through hand signals or an interpreter." Id. at
917 (footnote omitted).
129. This can arise in cases of deaf people with all kinds of interpretation needs.
See, e.g., People v. Branson, 475 N.E.2d 905, 911 (11L App. Ct. 1984) (noting that "the
trial judge noted for the record that the defendant had been bright and alert through-
out the trial"); State v. Hansen, 464 P.2d 960, 961 (Ariz. 1970) (noting that the trial
judge found that the defendant was "fairly adept at reading lips").
130. 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
131. 749 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
132. People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 427 n.2.
133. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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stand spoken language.1 3 4 At his prior trials, he nodded in response
to explanations and never requested an interpreter. Although his
previous defense attorney, testifying for the state, claimed that he
had not noticed any serious communication problem, the defendant
was unable to recite correctly the acts for which he had been previ-
ously convicted. 35 The new defense attorney also presented expert
testimony on the "psycho-linguistic implications of problems related
to the art of interpretation" to explain why many deaf people nod
their heads (particularly in stressful situations), the limits of "lip-
reading" in courtroom situations, and the importance of using an
impartial certified interpreter. 1386
The Rivera court defined the issue as whether the failure to pro-
vide the defendant with an interpreter amounted to a deprivation of
due process, and "[c]rucial to an analysis of this issue is an under-
standing of what an uninterpreted trial means to a deaf person.'
3 7
It regarded a New York statute requiring interpretation as embody-
ing a constitutional right and agreed that "a hearing-impaired per-
son cannot receive a fair trial absent a qualified sign-language inter-
preter."' 18 The court concluded that the inadequate interpretation
deprived the defendant of the right to participate in his own de-
fense, confront witnesses against him, and receive effective assis-
tance of counsel. The court further noted that, based upon the prin-
ciples outlined in Zerbst, 39 the defendant's failure to request an
ASL interpreter did not amount to a waiver of these Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights." 0
Adams v. State"' involved another non-ASL fluent defendant. At
trial, the defense counsel never requested any form of interpreta-
tion. Instead, counsel wrote down the direct examination questions
(the defendant was able to respond in spoken language) and in-
formed the defendant of the proceedings through written notes on
only two occasions. 2 The Texas Court of Appeals applied the lan-
guage of an earlier case of a Spanish-speaking defendant"4s and held
that "[iun the absence of the opportunity to be aware of the pro-
ceedings and the testimony of witnesses against her, appellant was
denied the constitutional right of confrontation and, that right not
134. People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 429.
137. Id. at 432.
138. Id. at 433.
139. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that waiver of a consti-
tutional right must be done knowingly and competently, and courts should make
every reasonable presumption against finding such a waiver).
140. People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
141. 749 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
142. Id. at 636.
143. Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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being knowingly and intelligently waived, her trial and conviction
are null and void." 4 More significant was the court's reiteration
that it is the duty of the trial court, not the defendant or defense
counsel, to make sure the defendant adequately understands the
proceedings: "Ensuring that the defendant has that [constitutionally
required] minimum understanding is primarily the task of the trial
judge. . . Counsel is not obliged to implement the right of con-
frontation. That duty is imposed upon the court by the confronta-
tion clause in the Sixth Amendment.
1
"45
The dimensions of the right to interpretation in state courts re-
main unsettled. As in federal case law, the decisions demonstrate a
non-uniform application of trial court discretion and responsibility.
The problems originate in both the trial and appellate courts. In
Turner and Fleagle, appellate courts deferred to the trial courts' ac-
tions although they were based upon erroneous assumptions about
the interpretation needs of the defendants. In cases like these, trial
judges fail in their roles as protectors of deaf defendant's rights, and
reviewing courts give trial judges a wide degree of discretion. The
courts in Adams and Rivera, by contrast, conducted thorough analy-
ses of the defendants' communication needs and the impact on their
constitutional rights. In the latter cases, the courts found it was the
responsibility of the trial court, not the defendant or defense coun-
sel, to prevent a compromise of constitutional rights. The result of
these differing approaches to interpretation is a great disparity of
treatment of deaf people in state criminal adjudication systems,
which flies in the face of the essential guarantees of the
Constitution.
HI. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
A search for a constitutional basis for a right to interpretation re-
quires analysis beyond the texts of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. A set of principles recognized as the fundamental con-
stitutional protections for all defendants has emerged from the juris-
prudence of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Applying these
principles to the cases of deaf criminal defendants demonstrates
that adequate interpretation is a constitutional requirement.140
144. Adams v. State, 749 S.W.2d at 637 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 638 (citations omitted).
146. This analysis is unnecessary in the context of international human rights law
where the right to interpretation during criminal proceedings is expressly recognized
as a fundamental human right. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(3)(f), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the
United States in 1992) ("In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:....
[t]o have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court."); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(e), 213
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In federal courts, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution147 provides the primary source of criminal defendants'
rights at trial: it explicitly protects a defendant's rights to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to confront prose-
cution witnesses, and to be provided the assistance of counsel. 148
Courts have also recognized trial rights that are embodied in the
principles of the Constitution but not expressly provided in the text,
including the right to be present and competent, and to assist in
one's own defense.149 Through the doctrine of "selective incorpora-
tion" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,150 the
Supreme Court has applied to state court proceedings all of these
Sixth Amendment protections because they are "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." 5 ' Criminal defendants in state courts are
protected by provisions of state constitutions as well. 1 2
U.N.T.S. 222 (text essentially identical to International Covenant); American Con-
vention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8(2)(a), 9 I.L.M.
673 (text essentially identical to International Covenant).
147. The language of the Sixth Amendment is as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
148. The rights under the Sixth Amendment attach at the commencement of
criminal proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
149. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text (right to be competent at
trial) and notes 185-96 and accompanying text (right to be present and assist in
defense).
150. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
151. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The Court has made applica-
ble to the states the following Sixth Amendment rights, among others: to be informed
of nature and cause of accusation, Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); to be
confronted with prosecution witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); to
have assistance of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); to be
competent at trial, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); and to be present at
trial, Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 117-18 (1934). The
Court has incorporated other provisions of the Sixth Amendment as well, but they
are beyond the scope of this Comment. See JOSEPH G. COOK, THE RIGHTS OF THE
AcCUSED, § 1:5 (2d ed. 1985).
152. See Paul Marcus, State Constitutional Protection for Defendants in Crimi-
nal Prosecutions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 151 (1988); Ken Gormley, ed., State Constitutions
and Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the 21st Century, 67 OR. L. REv. 689 (1988).
Both articles argue that state constitutional rights of defendants are being given an
increasing amount of weight in light of the decreasing protection under the Federal
Constitution.
Maine's Constitution provides the following rights for criminal defendants at trial:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
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This part of the Comment will analyze the constitutional sources
for interpretation in terms of each of the rights afforded to criminal
defendants in general. The meaning and underlying rationale of the
right to interpretation will be outlined. Then, employing that ration-
ale, this Comment will demonstrate how preserving that right in the
trial of a deaf criminal defendant requires adequate interpretation
throughout the trial proceedings.
A. The Right to Confront Prosecution Witnesses
The "right to confrontation" of witnesses is an express provision
in the United States Constitution, applicable in all courts, state as
well as federal. 153 There are two aspects to this right. The first con-
cerns the prohibition of hearsay testimony by the prosecution.'
The second aspect, which is more applicable to the issue of interpre-
tation, arises when there has been some interference with the de-
fendant's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The underly-
ing principle recognizes that "[c]onfrontation means more than
being allowed to confront the witness physically."15 5 The ability of a
defendant to conduct a cross-examination and expose the direct tes-
timony's weaknesses is considered a critical fact-finding tool in crim-
inal trials. 156
It seems reasonable that the right to confront witnesses would in-
clude the actual ability to understand the witnesses' testimony and
to assist the attorney in cross-examination.' 5 ' As observed in one
the accused and counsel to the accused, or either, at the election of the
accused;
To demand the nature and cause of the accusation, and have a copy
thereof;
To be confronted by the witnesses against the accused;
To have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in favor of the
accused;
To have a speedy, public and impartial trial, and, except in trials by mar-
tiai law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity. The accused shall not be
compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by judgment of that per-
son's peers or the law of the land.
MR. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (West Supp. 1992-1993).
153. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
154. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (requiring prosecutors seek-
ing to introduce hearsay evidence to demonstrate both the unavailability of the de-
clarant and an "indicia of reliability").
155. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1973).
156. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970):
[T]he particular vice which gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the
practice of trying defendants on "evidence" which consisted solely of ex
parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus
denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-
face encounter in front of the trier of fact.
157. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416
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treatise on defendants' constitutional rights, "[t]he right to confront
one's accuser would be an empty protection if the accused, because
of physical impairment or a lack of comprehension of the language
spoken, was unable to understand the testimony or proceedings." 158
Many courts that have found a right to interpretation have based
this conclusion, at least in part, on the established right to
confrontation. 159
In a Texas decision, Field v. State,60 the court found that a fail-
ure to request an interpreter amounted to a waiver of a deaf defend-
ant's right to confrontation."" This finding acknowledged the inti-
mate connection between confrontation and interpretation but was
not consistent with the Supreme Court's requirement that a waiver
of a constitutional right be knowing and intelligent. 6 ' The right to
confrontation requires trial courts to ensure that defendants under-
stand prosecution testimony well enough to be able to comment on
the veracity of the statements and assist defense attorneys in cross-
examination. In the case of deaf defendants, the trial court's respon-
sibility requires it to provide adequate interpretation, regardless of
whether a specific motion or request is made.
B. The Right to Understand the Nature and Cause of the
Accusation
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to un-
derstand the nature and cause of the accusation. 6 3 The issue of en-
forcement of this right often arises in cases where there has not been
a full trial and a defendant has entered a plea of guilty. Courts often
analyze the issues at trial in terms of competency, as is discussed in
the following section. The right to understand the nature and cause
of'the accusation clearly requires a minimum level of communica-
tion and understanding between hearing participants within the
criminal justice system and the accused to avoid a "Kafkaesque"
proceeding. For deaf defendants, interpretation is a necessary pre-
U.S. 907 (1974). ("Clearly, the right to confront witnesses would be meaningless if the
accused could not understand their testimony, and the effectiveness of cross-examina-
tion would be severely hampered.").
158. See COOK, supra note 151, § 18:8.
159. See, e.g., United States ex reL. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d
Cir. 1970); Terry v. State, 105 So. 386, 387 (Ala. 1925); People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d
426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
160. 232 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
161. Id. at 718. A parallel issue that has arisen in criminal appeals involves the
use of interpreters for a deaf prosecution witness. Defendants have challenged the use
of interpreters in several different contexts including one occasion in Maine where
the interpreter knew the witness previously. State v. Doucette, 398 A.2d 36 (Me.
1978).
162. See supra note 89.
163. See supra note 147.
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requisite to such understanding.
Some state and federal courts have found that a trial court erred
when it accepted the pleas of a deaf defendant who did not have
adequate interpretation. The Eighth Circuit, in Mothershead v.
King,'" granted a defendant's habeas corpus petition after he had
entered his plea without an interpreter. The court found that the
Sixth Amendment acted as a bar to a valid conviction and sentence
when a defendant did not understand the proceedings." ' An Ala-
bama state court, in Goodman v. State,066 reached a similar result.
Other courts have reached less enlightened decisions. In State v.
Hansen,'61 the Arizona Supreme Court accepted the plea of a de-
fendant after determining that he was "fairly adept at reading
lips."'68 The Alabama Supreme Court, in Turner v. State,00 held
that the trial record supported judicial findings that the defendant
understood the nature and cause of his accusations since "the circuit
judge who arraigned the defendant looked the defendant in the face
as he spoke to him and wrote notes to him. The defendant 'nodded'
when asked if he understood.' 70 Clearly, a trial court's ignorance of
interpretation needs can severely prejudice a defendant's rights.
Had either judge been cognizant of the limits of "lipreading," he or
she would have had little basis upon which to accept the defendant's
plea.
C. The Right to Be Competent at Trial
A right derived from the express right to understand the nature
and cause of the accusation is the right to be competent at trial.
While this Comment does not suggest that deaf people are mentally
"incompetent" as a result of a hearing loss, the principle underlying
this important right has been and should be applied in the cases of
all deaf defendants as well as to the mentally ill."' The United
States Supreme Court has held that anyone who lacks the capacity
to understand, to consult with counsel, and to assist in the prepara-
tion of his or her own defense, cannot be subjected to a criminal
164. 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940).
165. Id. at 1006.
166. 226 So. 2d 94 (Ala. Ct. App. 1969).
167. 464 P.2d 960 (Ariz. 1970).
168. Id. at 961.
169. 429 So. 2d 645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes
119-22.
170. Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d at 646. As discussed in Part I. the nodding might
not have been an indication of comprehension on the part of the defendant. See
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
171. The New York Supreme Court justice in Rivera, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 130-40, commented wryly, "[a] more accurate view is that the judicial sys-
tem [is] incompetent to constitutionally try the handicapped defendant." People v.
Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 433 n.11 (Sup. CL 1984).
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trial. 1 72 This right was first articulated in Dusky v. United States78
and was applied to state court proceedings through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Pate v. Robinson.1 74
At common law, deaf people were automatically assumed to be
incompetent to stand trial.275 Today, since recognized methods of
interpretation are available the assumption is anachronistic. The is-
sue of competency can arise, however, when a defendant, due to a
language difference, is forced to sit through the proceedings without
the ability to understand or participate. Although the source of the
lack of comprehension is different from defendants who are men-
tally ill, the result is comparable. The Negron court found that the
language difference between the defendant and the proceedings in
that case was analogous to a "mental disease or defect," warranting
the constitutional protection afforded by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 76 The New Hampshire Supreme Court went a step
further and articulated the fundamental distinction between cases
involving mental conditions and deafness: "[R]emedial measures
could have been taken to enable [the defendant] to assist in his own
defense .... "1 Therefore, a trial court has the responsibility of en-
suring that every defendant, deaf or hearing, does in fact have suffi-
cient ability to understand the proceedings and to consult with his
or her attorney.
Non-ASL fluent deaf people can present an additional challenge
to the criminal justice system when no "remedial measures" can be
determined and used. Some deaf people cannot communicate by
ASL or other manual language and have not acquired sufficient
knowledge of English to enable them to read a computer-assisted
transcript system or speechread to any degree. A famous Illinois
case involving a man in such a situation has been litigated for more
172. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
173. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
174. 383 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1966). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court explained
that "competence to stand trial denotes that the accused is capable of understanding
the nature of the charges and object of the proceedings against him, of compre-
hending his own condition in reference thereto, and, in cooperation with his counsel,
of conducting his defense in a rational and reasonable manner." State v. Hewett, 538
A.2d 268, 269 (Me. 1988) (citations omitted). Again, this is not to suggest that deaf
people are "irrational," but the Law Court's test clearly indicates that the defendant
must be in a position to contribute to his own case rather than placing all control in
the hands of his attorney.
175. Bruce Harry, M.D. & Park Elliot Dietz, M.D., M.P.H., Ph.D., Offenders in a
Silent World: Hearing Impairment and Deafness in Relation to Criminality, Incom-
petence, and Insanity, 13 BULL. OF AM. AcAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE L. 85, 86 (1985).
176. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir. 1970).
Ferrell, in contrast, rejected this approach because the defendant did not have a
"mental defect." Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1137 (5th Cir. 1978).
177. State v. Staples, 437 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1981).
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than twenty years.178 Donald Lang, a deaf man who had no ASL
skills, was arrested and charged with murder in 1965. The Illinois
Supreme Court, in a landmark case, found that he could not be in-
definitely confined if he had no mental impairment that could be
"cured."' 7 9 The court held that the trial court must give Lang a
"reasonable opportunity to exercise his constitutional rights"180 by
178. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d 109 (111. 1970) (habeas corpus
petition brought on behalf of Lang by Lowell Myers, Esquire). The Myers case was
also the subject of a 1979 television movie, "Dummy."
179. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d at 112-13. Although the case was
reinstated on remand, Lang was released when the state was unable to proceed after
the death of the principal witness. People v. Lang, 325 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ill App.
1975). Donald Lang was arrested again in 1971 for another murder, and the same
dilemma faced the Illinois courts. An interpreter was useless where the defendant had
no skills in either ASL or English. Although no competency hearing was held, Lang
was diagnosed with "mental retardation with emotional instability," and his attorney
chose to pursue a trial rather than risk lifetime confinement. Id. at 307-08. An Illinois
appellate court reversed the conviction upon a finding that "there were no trial proce-
dures which could effectively compensate for the handicaps of a deaf mute with
whom there could be no communication" and, therefore, the defendant "could not be
constitutionally tried or convicted." Id. at 308-09. Eventually, Lang was found to
meet the requirements for involuntary commitment. People v. Lang, 587 N.E.2d 490,
491 (Ill App. 1992). Lang's fate, however, appears to be caught in a cycle of appellate
court decisions (of which there have been at least six), as well as hearings to deter-
mine his eligibility for a discharge and fitness to stand trial. Id. at 490 (affirming
denial of discharge); 498 N.E.2d 1105 (IlM 1986) (reversing prior discharge hearing
denial and requiring new hearing); 468 N.E.2d 1303 (I. App. 1984)-(finding that de-
fendant was entitled to "fitness" hearing but not discharge hearing); 391 N.E.2d 350
(Ill. 1979) (remanding to determine fitness to stand trial); 378 N.E.2d 1106 (IlL App.
1978) (affirming denial of writ of habeas corpus); 325 N.E.2d 305 (Ill App. 1975)
(reversing of jury conviction and remanding for fitness hearing).
After twenty-three years of confinement, Lang has yet to be tried constitutionally.
The evidence produced against him is the basis of that confinement although the
courts have never heard his version of the events of the night of the murder. In 1987,
although granting the state its fourteenth involuntary commitment order against
Lang, the Cook County Circuit Court judge noted the irony that had been created as
a result of Lang's confinement and urged the staff at the Illinois Department of
Mental Health to reduce the punitive measures taken against Lang.
It could be the "unintended" rigidity of staff toward him and his lack of
understanding the reason for the rules that may be part of the prob-
lem .... Lang has been involuntarily hospitalized and in jails for more
than 17 years, during which he has been denied basic human desires and
yearnings everyone has. Perhaps his anger, frustrations and acting-out
comes from his lack of understanding why he is kept in against his will. It is
shocking to the conscience that after 17 years of commitment and training,
very little indeed has been done to understand him, his motivations and
perhaps his sense of despair and frustration, and to communicate with him
in any depth.
Charles Mount, State Ripped for Care of Deaf Suspect, CHLF. Dec. 30, 1987, at
3.
180. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d at 113. The Myers decision men-
tions the efforts of the state to teach Lang ASL so that he could stand trial. These
efforts were clearly against his wishes. Id. at 112. The court in Ferrell made a similar
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allowing communication of the testimony. The court failed, however,
to acknowledge the impossibility of this task. The result in the Illi-
nois case also influenced the United States Supreme Court case
Jackson v. Indiana,181 which prohibited indefinite commitment of
persons who would never be competent to stand trial.
The scenario of a deaf defendant with little or no ability to com-
municate with the hearing world is not unique. In 1992 a Ports-
mouth, Virginia court concluded it had no alternative but to rule
that Curtis Turner, a twenty-one-year-old man accused of murder,
was "permanently incompetent" solely because he did not know sign
language and there was no other mode of communicating with him
at trial. An expert testified that Turner had the ability of a six-year-
old "to match pictures on a page with a word or statement."18 2 He
had spent three years in a state hospital when the judge finally re-
leased him.183 A Florida appeals court reversed the second degree
murder conviction of a seventeen-year-old deaf man with limited
skills in ASL and English after it was shown that the expert wit-
nesses at trial were divided in their assessment of his competency to
stand trial and the transcript revealed that the defendant was inca-
pable of explaining his version of the events to the court."" Al-
suggestion in its instructions to the trial court on retrying the case: "If Ferrell still
has not learned sign language, the court should determine whether it would be feasi-
ble to require him to be trained in its use. If so, Ferrell could be retried . . . after
allowing a reasonable time for him to learn sign language." Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d
at 1133. Although no court has ever discussed it, there may be some due process
concerns with forcing a defendant to learn a language for the sole purpose (from the
state's perspective) of trying him for a crime.
The United States Supreme Court avoided addressing a related issue recently in
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992) ("The question of whether a compe-
tent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medica-
tion would render him incompetent at trial is not before us."). The Court, however,
strongly suggested that a state may have this power "by establishing that it could not
obtain an adjudication of. . .guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means." Id.
The issue remains open, and it would be interesting to see how far a court would
allow a pre-trial detainee to be controlled in an incarceration or medical context (as
Lang's was) for the sake of the "public's interest in the administration of criminal
law." Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d at 1132. This is a tempting step for a state to take in
light of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (finding that indefinite confine-
ment of criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetence to stand trial vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Shook v.
State, 552 So. 2d 841, 844-45 (Miss. 1989) (holding that a trial court judge did not err
when he refused to delay the trial of a deaf criminal defendant until he could be
taught ASL).
181. 406 U.S. 715, 735-36 (1972).
182. Case of Deaf Man Baffles Court System, UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 3, 1992.
183. Id.
184. Holmes v. State, 494 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). A recent Louisiana
case, State v. Barber, 617 So. 2d 974 (La. Ct. App. 1993) is similar in that the reversal
of the conviction came as a result of the appellate court's review of the defendant's
unresponsive answers in the transcript. In light of these opinions, one wonders
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though these cases create the greatest challenges for courts and de-
fense attorneys, the defendant cannot be punished as a result by
allowing his rights to fall below the constitutionally protected mini-
mum. Society, therefore, may have to pay the ultimate price (i.e.
releasing murderers) for restricting the educational and linguistic
development of deaf children.
D. The Right to Be Present at Trial and Assist in Defense
The defendant's right to be present during trial is closely related
to the rights to be competent and to confront prosecution witnesses.
Each recognizes and protects the important role of the defendant
during trial even if she never takes the stand.185 The United States
Supreme Court found the right to be present at trial to derive from
both the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses180 and to be among
the fundamental rights incorporated in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.'8" In Snyder v. Massachusetts,'" the
Court held that a defendant must be afforded a "reasonably sub-
stantial opportunity" to defend against charges by assisting in her
own defense. In a recent case, Riggins v. Nevada,80 the Court found
that the forced administration of psychotropic medication may well
have impaired the interaction between the defendant and his attor-
ney, as well as the defendant's comprehension, at his hearing.
Again, this Comment is not suggesting that deaf people are not
whether the lack of comprehension would have gone unaddressed by the appellate
courts in either case had the defendants exercised their right to not testify. These
cases suggest that it is only when hearing people cannot comprehend the proceedings
that the actual degree of language difference is given due regard.
185. See State v. Hewett, 538 A.2d 268 (Me. 1988); see also CooK, supra note 151,
§ 18:7 ('The right [to confrontation] is essentially a trial right, and its most self-
evident manifestation is in the right of the accused to be present at his trial.").
186. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985). Originally the Supreme Court
interpreted this rule so strictly that it held that the right to be present could not be
waived because of its fundamental importance. Lewis v. United States, 146 US. 370,
374 (1892). This rule was limited and finally abrogated in Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442 (1912) (limiting the Lewis holding to cases in which the defendant was actu-
ally in custody) and Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (holding that defend-
ant's failure to return after lunch recess was effective waiver of right to be present).
See also FED. R. CaRI P. 43. Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 provides:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the
trial including the impaneling of the jury, and the return of the verdict, and
at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules.
In prosecutions for any offenses the defendant's voluntary absence after the
trial has been commenced in the defendant's presence shall not prevent
continuing the trial.
187. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). Maine defendants enjoy
this right as well under the Maine Constitution. State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771 (Me.
1976).
188. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
189. 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1816 (1992).
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"present" when they do not have a mode of communication with
hearing people. The principle underlying this right is violated, how-
ever, if the trial is a meaningless array of moving lips or turned
backs for the defendant. In order to satisfy constitutional require-
ments, a defendant must be "present" in the sense of being able to
follow the proceedings and assist her attorney in the preparation of
closing arguments and cross-examination. In Drope v. Missouri,'00
the Court recognized that the meaning of "presence" goes beyond
mere physical appearance at trial. It described the right to be com-
petent at trial "as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia;
the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in
the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend him-
self."'191 Although the Court has held that a defendant can lose his
right to be present at trial by seriously disrupting the proceedings, 192
at least one Supreme Court Justice believed that when a court or-
ders the removal of a defendant it must also "make reasonable ef-
forts" to allow communication with his attorney.193
The courts in Negron, Rivera, and Ferrell found that the right to
be present and assist in one's defense required that a deaf defendant
be provided with adequate interpretation. 9 4 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Negron wrote, "[c]onsiderations of fair-
ness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and the potency of our
adversary system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a
defendant who is not present at his own trial . . . ."19 An Illinois
appellate court found no such compromise of a defendant's right
when the trial court refused to order amplification of the proceed-
ings, and defendant had been "bright and alert" during trial.10 An
application of the rationale outlined in Snyder, Riggins, and Drope
suggests that such an approach is wrong absent a finding that a de-
fendant could participate meaningfully during his trial. The defend-
ant's appearance cannot be considered adequate evidence that he
was truly "present" under the Supreme Court's definition.
190. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
191. Id. at 171 (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of
Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)). The Court also noted in
Illinois v. Allen that a drawback to dealing with disruptive defendants by binding
and gagging them is that "one of the defendant's primary advantages of being present
at the trial, his ability to communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced .... .
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
192. Id. at 343.
193. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring).
194. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970);
People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d
1128, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978).
195. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 389 (citations
omitted).
196. People v. Branson, 475 N.E.2d 905, 911 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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E. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The right to be present at trial is also linked to the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel since a productive attorney-client relation-
ship during trial is an essential prerequisite for an attorney to re-
present his or her client competently and effectively. The Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been applied
to the states197 and is present in the Maine Constitution as well., 3
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Cronic'5  that a de-
fendant could challenge a conviction not only when his attorney had
made a specific error or errors at trial but also if external circum-
stances impaired the effectiveness of the representation.20 Interfer-
ence in attorney-client communication is an example of such an im-
pairment. In Geders v. United States,01 the Court reversed a
conviction after a trial judge prevented communication between an
attorney and his client during an overnight recess.202 This decision
recognized the importance of communication between a defendant
197. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
198. Ma CONsT. art. I, § 6. See also State v. Currier, 409 A.2d 241, 243 (Me. 1979)
(stating that the right to effective assistance of counsel in Maine courts is guaranteed
under both the Maine and United States Constitutions).
199. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
200. Id. at 662. Although the primary focus of this section is governmental inter-
ference with effectiveness of counsel by not providing adequate communication, a few
courts have reversed convictions of deaf defendants based upon specific errors made
by defense attorneys.
In State v. Staples, 437 A.2d 266 (N.H. 1981), both of the defense attorneys were
aware of the defendant's severe hearing impairment prior to trial but took no action
to ensure that there was adequate interpretation at trial by alerting the court. They
attempted to remedy the situation by whispering the testimony into the defendant's
ear. Not surprisingly, the defendant could barely hear any of the testimony. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court relied upon the ABA Standards for the Defense Function,
§ 4-3.6 at 4.45 2d ed. 1980, which encourages defense attorneys to inform defendants
of their rights and "take all necessary action to vindicate such rights." State v.
Staples, 437 A.2d at 268.
In Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), the defendant filed a mo-
tion for rehearing after he was tried without an interpreter. At the motion hearing it
was shown that, despite the defendant's severe to profound bearing loss (proven later
by expert testimony), his attorney had taken no steps to obtain an interpreter. A co-
defendant began to take notes for Peeler during the trial but gave up after he could
no longer keep up with testimony (the co-defendant, who happened to be defendant
Peeler's son, alleged that he had been denied his right to be present at trial since he
was distracted by the note-taking; the appellate court found he had voluntarily
waived his right by taking on "interpretation duties"). Id. at 689-91.
These cases are inconsistent with the notion that it is the trial court's duty to pro-
tect a defendant's constitutional rights. On the other hand, given the ambiguity in
this area of the law, it might not detract from the legal duty of the court to expect
some initiative from defense attorneys.
201. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
202. Id. at 91. But see Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (finding that com-
munication with attorney during brief recess immediately prior to cross.examination
of defendant was not constitutionally required).
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and his attorney throughout the trial. Without interpretation, such
communication is impossible for most deaf defendants.
An issue in several appeals has been the failure to provide an in-
terpreter at the defense table during trial in addition to the inter-
pretation of the proceedings themselves. The case law discussed in
the previous section concerning the right to assist in one's own de-
fense 0 3 underscores the importance of facile communication be-
tween attorney and client throughout the proceedings. Unless an at-
torney is ASL fluent or is able to communicate easily with her client
in some other way, a lack of interpretation during the trial will es-
sentially cut off the defendant from his attorney.
In addition, courts have found that the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel attaches during preparations for trial. This princi-
ple was articulated in the landmark case Powell v. Alabama,
20 4
which held that, although an attorney is appointed, one can none-
theless be deprived of "the aid of counsel in any real sense" if no
assistance is provided "during perhaps the most crucial period of
the proceedings . . . from the time of arraignment until the begin-
ning of . . . trial. '20 5 Justice Sutherland provided an example of
how, when taken to the extreme, deprivation of counsel of this sort
"would be little short of judicial murder" if a "deaf and dumb, illit-
erate and feeble-minded" defendant is sentenced to death.2 0 6 In sev-
eral cases, including a case arising in Maine, Maine v. Moulton,2 0
7
the Supreme Court has reversed convictions when states have di-
luted this protection during pretrial periods. In Moulton, the Court
not only required states to refrain from interfering with the assis-
tance of counsel but also found an obligation to "respect and pre-
serve" the defendant's choice to seek that aid.205 Given the Court's
recognition of the period prior to trial as a time when a defendant
and his attorney must be allowed to work together, law enforcement
agencies and courts have an obligation not only to refrain from in-
terference but also to ensure meaningful communication throughout
the entire process.
Despite the importance of this right, most federal and state inter-
preter laws have overlooked the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel, as will be discussed below in Part IV.2°9 Severe prejudice to the
203. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
204. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
205. Id. at 57.
206. Id. at 72-73.
207. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
208. Id. at 171; see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (apply-
ing principles articulated in Powell v. Alabama to federal criminal defendants).
209. See, e.g., People v. Hammons, 771 P.2d 1, 2 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that deaf defendant was not deprived of claimed "right to communicate with coun-
sel" since the state interpreting statute did not specifically require the trial court to
appoint more than one interpreter for the trial). See also infra notes 215-47 and ac-
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effectiveness of a defense can result if there is a lack of clear and
thorough communication between an attorney and her client prior
to and during court proceedings.21 0 A defendant's understanding of
the adjudication procedure will be impaired, and his attorney will
have incomplete knowledge of circumstances of the alleged crime.
Also, if a defendant plans to take the stand in his own defense and
testify through an interpreter, it is important to prepare the testi-
mony with the use of an interpreter.21" '
Several specific constitutional sources support a right to interpre-
tation without stretching the existing jurisprudence. The case law in
both federal and state courts establishes a minimum standard of
constitutional protection for all criminal defendants. Application of
these principles to deaf defendants also requires recognition of the
unique features of deafness and interpretation. In order to ensure
that deaf defendants receive the same constitutional protection as
hearing defendants, adequate interpretation during pretrial prepara-
tions and trial must be provided. When the limitations of speech-
reading, the poor quality of the education of most deaf children, the
dangers of using non-certified interpreters, and the significant num-
ber of non-ASL fluent deaf adults are overlooked, the rights of deaf
people will too frequently fall below this minimum protection.
IV. STATUTORY SOURCES OF THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
If all constitutional principles were recognized and applied, stat-
utes guaranteeing a right to interpretation would not be needed
since the right is already guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, as outlined in the previous section. However, there is
no reason why a statute cannot provide the same protection as a
companying text on the Federal Court Interpreters Act.
210. In State v. Hansen, 464 P.2d 960 (Az. 1970), for example, the Supreme Court
of Arizona upheld the conviction of a deaf defendant sentenced to seven to ten years
for grand theft who alleged on appeal that not only could he not understand the
testimony presented at his preliminary hearing but also he thought his attorney said
that he would receive only probation if he pleaded guilty. The court's decision in-
cluded a transcript of the entry of the pleas with several indications that defendant
was confused as to what was occurring. The court upheld the conviction since the
defense attorney explained the consequences of the plea "in some detail" and the
defendant was "fairly adept at reading lips." Id. at 961, 964.
See also Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965) ("There is no constitu.
tional right, as such, requiring the assistance of a court-appointed interpreter to sup-
plement the right to counsel" but a language barrier between a defendant and his
attorney can be a consideration as to whether he was adequately represented.);
United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (uphold-
ing the conviction of a Spanish-speaking defendant who could not communicate with
his attorney while Spanish-speaking witnesses were on the stand since the interpreter
was being used to translate their testimony into English because the trial court al-
lowed interruptions for conference with counsel).
211. Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4.
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constitutional provision, particularly where there is no unanimity in
the courts about the nature and extent of that protection. In some
cases the law may attempt to expand upon a constitutional right or
simply outline a procedure for enforcement.2
12
The latter half of this century has seen an explosion of legislation,
on both the state and federal levels, directly or indirectly addressing
the need for interpretation in criminal proceedings. Unfortunately,
these laws have not gone far enough to protect the minimum consti-
tutional rights outlined in the previous section. The result is that,
despite these laws, some deaf defendants' rights are still compro-
mised during proceedings. The problems arise from three sources.
First, the laws themselves do not specifically address the needs of all
deaf people, including those without knowledge of ASL, those who
use visual gestural systems, persons with mental illness, or those
who have other unique communication needs. For such individuals,
the appointment of oral and/or Deaf interpreters or the use of
equipment for interpretation is required to ensure comprehension of
the proceedings. 213 Second, the laws do not go far enough to ensure
that all of the constitutional requirements are met, such as a pre-
sumption against waiver and the right to communicate with counsel.
Finally, the courts reviewing these laws on appeal apply only the
specific requirements of the law, and if these are met, the courts do
not examine whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are
satisfied as well. Although many courts purport to perform a consti-
tution-based analysis of a deaf defendant's rights, they do so in
name only. Both Maine's statute and a case arising under it, State v.
Green, 14 exemplify these problems and the implications for deaf de-
fendants at trial.
A. The Federal Court Interpreters Act
The United States Congress passed the Court Interpreters Act 1
in 1978 in response to the Negron case216 and lobbying efforts by,
among others, leaders in the Deaf community. The Court Interpret-
ers Act applies to all non-English-speaking and deaf parties in cases
brought by the federal government, and covers all criminal proceed-
212. The Law Court has specifically found that the Maine Declaration of Rights
(of which Article I, § 6 is a part) is self-executing but "the Legislature is not thereby
precluded from enacting legislation to facilitate the exercise of these constitutional
privileges and the enforcement of these protective rights." State v. Bachelder, 403
A.2d 754, 758-59 (Me. 1979).
213. Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4.
214. 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989). See discussion infra at notes 263-86 and accompany-
ing text.
215. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1827-1828 (West Supp. 1993).
216. 434 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1970); H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 93, at 3, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4653.
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ings.217 The law places responsibility for identifying the need for in-
terpretation on both the defense counsel and the trial courts. This
duty arises whenever a party has a hearing impairment that "inhib-
its comprehension," although the statute does not specify what level
of impairment triggers this responsibility. 218 The law also requires
the defendant to waive her right to an interpreter on the record;210
gives preference for the use of certified interpreters;2 0 requires si-
multaneous, not summary, translation;221 and requires the court to
cover the cost of interpretation. 222 The law does not, however, apply
in civil cases that are not initiated by the government, and it is
questionable whether it could be invoked in evidentiary hearings
brought in federal habeas corpus actions.
223
Although the language of the Court Interpreters Act may appear
to approximate the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, federal
courts have not interpreted the statute's provisions strictly nor have
they examined thoroughly whether constitutional as well as statu-
tory rights may have been compromised in a particular case. It
should be noted that all of the case law on the statute has developed
through the appeals of hearing, non-English-speaking defendants.
With the exception of a bankruptcy case,224 federal courts have
never addressed directly an issue under the statute in the context of
a deaf individual.225 The statute's provisions are the same for both
217. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827(d)(1). See also FED. R CmL P. 28, which allows for the
appointment of interpreters but does not express it in terms of a defendant's right.
218. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827(d)(1).
219. Id. § 1827(f)(1).
220. Id. § 1827(d)(1).
221. Id. § 1827(k).
222. See id. § 1827(g). The legislative history indicates that an interpreter should
be provided and paid for by the court, regardless of a defendant's ability to pay. HIR
REP. No. 1687, supra note 93, at 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4658.
223. The law includes within its definition of judicial proceedings initiated by the
United States, "proceedings upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus initiated in
the name of the United States by a relator." 28 U.S.C.A. § 18270).
Also, a bankruptcy judge ruled that the deaf debtors in a bankruptcy case did not
have a right to an interpreter under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827. He also found no constitu-
tional violation under either the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause for
such denial since the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitu-
tional right to have one's debts discharged in bankruptcy. In re Morrison, 22 BR 969
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). The statute itself does not specifically indicate whether
bankruptcy proceedings were intended to be covered but does provide in 28 US.C.A.
§ 1827(i) that the term "presiding judicial officer" used in the statute "refers to any
judge of a United States district court, including a bankruptcy judge. .. .
224. In re Morrison, 22 B.R. 969 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
225. The absence of these cases does raise the question of why there are, and have
been, so few deaf defendants' appeals in the federal courts. Perhaps federal courts
have done a better job than most state courts in securing the rights of deaf defend-
ants while providing less protection to other non-English-speaking people. More
likely, however, deaf people are simply not tried in federal courts as often as in state
courts due to the nature of the crimes committed. For example, it may be that deaf
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deaf and hearing defendants and, presumably, the outcome would
be similar if a deaf defendant raised the same issues addressed in
the non-English-speaking defendant cases.
Few courts have actually reversed a conviction of a defendant who
claimed inadequate or flawed interpretation during trial. One such
reversal occurred in United States v. Tapia.22 6 The court followed
the language of the statute closely and found that a trial court judge
has an affirmative duty to inquire about the need for an interpreter.
The Fifth Circuit panel also held that a waiver is effective only if
made by the defendant and only after the nature and effect of the
waiver is explained to the defendant by the court. The court found
that deprivation of the rights provided under the statute can pre-
vent a defendant from receiving adequate assistance of counsel and
from confronting prosecution witnesses. 227
Most circuits, however, have given a far more restrictive interpre-
tation of the statute by giving broad discretion to trial court judges
and adopting the "balancing test" from United States v. Marti-
nez.228 One example of this approach was an Eleventh Circuit case,
United States v. Bennett.22 9 The court held that the statute did not
require that a Spanish language interpreter be appointed for each
defendant when three were tried together, even though the place-
ment of the single interpreter next to the witness box made it im-
possible for two of the three defendants to confer with their attor-
neys during testimony.2 30 Two other circuits upheld convictions in
similar circumstances. 23' In each of these cases, there was a clear
interference by the government with communication between attor-
ney and client during trial, despite the United States Supreme
Court's prohibition of such interference, as articulated in United
States v. Cronic'32 and Geders v. United States.233 Such interfer-
people are less likely to be involved in drug conspiracies, racketeering, organized
crime, or white collar crime. A pre-§ 1827 federal court case discussed above, Ferrell
v. Estelle, involved a habeas corpus appeal from state court convictions. Ferrell v.
Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978). The deaf defendant in Mothershead was a
federal prisoner, but the decision does not indicate the crime for which he was con-
victed. Mothershead v. King, 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940).
226. 631 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1980). Tapia was decided soon after United States v.
Martinez, 616 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981), see supra
notes 110-112 and accompanying text, but by a completely different panel with no
reference to the decision in Martinez.
227. United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209-10.
228. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
229. 848 F.2d 1134, 1141 (11th Cir. 1988).
230. Id. at 1140. The attorney for the third defendant was fluent in Spanish.
231. See United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1991).
232. 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (finding that the right to effective assistance of
counsel can be compromised by circumstances surrounding the representation of the
defendant). See discussion supra at notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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ence contravenes the defendant's rights to assist in his own defense
and have effective assistance of counsel and diminishes the effective-
ness of his presence at trial. This analysis of the importance of at-
torney-client communication, however, is absent from the cases in-
terpreting the federal statute.
United States v. Moya-Gomez 3 4 is one of several cases conferring
broad discretion upon trial courts' determinations of the need for
and adequacy of the interpretation. The Seventh Circuit upheld a
conviction in this case in which the defendant complained repeat-
edly that he could not understand the interpreter and specifically
could not understand some "legal terms" she was using. The trial
court judge stated on the record, "The interpreter is doing a marvel-
ous job in my opinion . . 235 While the court's actions violated
section 1827(e)(1) of the Court Interpreters Act, which requires dis-
missal of any interpreter who is unable to communicate effectively
with a party,236 and the defendant claimed on appeal not to have
understood the proceedings adequately, the court of appeals em-
ployed an "abuse of discretion" standard of review and deferred to
the trial court's determination that the interpretation was
adequate.23
7
Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell wrote
the opinion for a panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Valladares v.
United States, 238 allowing a criminal defendant's conviction to stand
after a non-certified interpreter had provided only summary transla-
tion rather than the simultaneous interpretation required by section
1827(k). 39 Although Justice Powell did not deny that the statute's
233. 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding that interference with attorney-client communi-
cations during trial resulted in deprivation of effective assistance of counsel). See dis-
cussion supra at notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
234. 860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub norn Estevez v. United
States, 492 U.S. 908 (1989).
235. Id.
236. "If any interpreter is unable to communicate effectively with... a party
(including a defendant in a criminal case)... the presiding judicial officer shall dis-
miss such interpreter and obtain the services of another interpreter .... " 28
U.S.C.A. § 1827(e)(1) (West Supp. 1993). The circuit court made no reference what-
soever to this requirement.
237. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 740.
238. 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989).
239. The federal statute provides in pertinent part:
The interpretation provided by certified or otherwise qualified interpreters
pursuant to this section shall be in the simultaneous mode for any party
... and in the consecutive mode for witnesses, except that the presiding
judicial officer, sua sponte or on the motion of a party, may authorize a
simultaneous, or consecutive interpretation when such officer determines
after a hearing on the record that such interpretation will aid in the effi-
cient administration of justice.
28 U.S.C.A § 1827(k). There is no allowance in the statute for the use of summary
translation at any time. The "interpreter" used at Valladares' trial was actually a
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requirements had not been followed,240 he reasoned that the convic-
tion should be upheld since allowing summary translation was
within the "sound discretion of the trial judge."2 '
In United States v. Perez,24 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit eased the responsibilities imposed on trial courts by United
States v. Tapia.2  The Perez court found that the Court Interpret-
ers Act requires express waiver by a non-English-speaking defend-
ant only after the trial court makes a threshold determination of
need. 4 The court of appeals deferred to the trial court's actions
and upheld the conviction although the defendant claimed to have
"some difficulty" with English.24 5 This case suggests a serious defi-
ciency in the statute. Since no minimum threshold of language im-
Spanish-speaking attorney present only on the first day of proceedings. Valladares v.
United States, 871 F.2d at 1565. See also United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436 (lst
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (concluding that only harmless error
resulted from summary translation).
240. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d at 1565-66. There was apparently little,
if any, dispute that the statute requires consecutive (simultaneous in the case of
ASL) translation and that only a summary translation was provided. Justice Powell,
however, found that the case law of § 1827 established that "[t]he ultimate question
is whether any inadequacy in the interpretation 'made the trial fundamentally un-
fair.'" Id. at 1566. This approach resembles one requiring a finding of actual
prejudice to the defendant. Such an analysis is not required in cases involving ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel due to external factors affecting the representation of the
defendant. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). Furthermore, this will-
ingness to dispose of the statute's specific requirements appears to undermine the
findings and intent of Congress that were the basis of the provisions. A House of
Representatives Report found that "[S]ummary translations allow the interpreter to
condense and distill the speech of the speaker." H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 93, at
8 reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4659.
241. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d at 1566. Retired Justice Powell consid-
ered the failure to object to the translation to be "a factor weighing against a finding
of abuse of discretion by the trial court." Id. However, this is a dubious approach for
practical reasons. The defense attorney may not have known a summary translation
occurred, and the defendant may not have known that simultaneous translation was
his right. A trial court could not have detected this either during proceedings but
could have taken steps prior to trial to discuss the statutory requirements with the
interpreter, defense attorney, and defendant.
The court also employed a test derived from a Ninth Circuit case, United States v.
Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dong Joon Ahn v. United
States, 479 U.S. 937 (1986) to determine whether the "purposes of the Act were ade-
quately met." Valladares' conviction was upheld largely because defense counsel
failed to object to the inadequate interpreting, although the errors committed could
be detected by the trial court.
242. 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2055 (1991).
243. 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that trial court judge has an
affirmative duty to inquire into the need for an interpreter). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 226-27.
244. United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d at 491.
245. Id. For a discussion concerning the problem of providing trial courts with the
discretion to determine the need for interpretation, see infra text accompanying note
320.
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pairment is required to invoke these rights, courts have imposed a
burden on defendants to demonstrate a severe need, in contrast to
imposing the duty on trial courts to assure that a defendant's consti-
tutional rights are protected. 2 6
The cases that allow some blurring of the requirements of the
Court Interpreters Act fail to consider the impact on defendants'
constitutional rights. For example, the United States Supreme Court
held that a physical barrier placed between a defendant and a child
witness during testimony is unconstitutional;2 7 but arguably the
right to confrontation is compromised even more by erroneous or
summary translation although the appeals courts fail to recognize
this. The court decisions interpreting the Court Interpreters Act in-
dicate that deaf people would fare as poorly, if not worse, in federal
appellate courts given the deference of the appellate courts to trial
court actions, their willingness to dispose of essential statutory re-
quirements, and their failure to recognize the constitutional implica-
tions of inadequate interpretation.
B. Statutes That Apply to State Court Proceedings
1. State Statutes Addressing a Right to Interpretation
A combination of state and federal law provides the statutory
means of securing the right to interpretation in state courts. Most
states have enacted legislation addressing interpretation in court
that either applies to all non-English-speaking defendants or specifi-
cally to deaf people. A brief survey of the statutes reveals that there
is considerable variety among them. Most cannot be considered
comprehensive enough to ensure that all constitutional requirements
have been met.24 8 For example, many statutes provide only for the
appointment of an interpreter, but do not require the use of other
forms of interpretation, such as CAT systems, for non-ASL fluent
deaf defendants.249 Statutes vary in designating who has primary re-
sponsibility for raising the issue of interpretation. 2 0 Few statutes
246. See supra note 108 (on fact/law distinction in constitutional law).
247. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988).
248. Sy DuBow, the Legal Director of the National Center for Law and Deafness,
considers most state laws inadequate and has devised his own "Model Interpreting
Statute" which can be found in DuBow Er AL, supra note 2, at 245.
249. See, e.g., ARm REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1992); CAL. Evw CODE § 754
(West Supp. 1993); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-90-204 (1987); CONN. GN. STAT. Arm
§ 46a-33 (West Supp. 1993); Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (West 1989 & Supp.
1992-1993); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A (West Supp. 1992); NRH- Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 521-A (Supp. 1992). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 332 (Supp. 1992) (party
or witness in court proceedings has right to assistive listening devices).
250. In many statutes the responsibilities of the parties, counsel, and court are
unclear. See, e.g., AR REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1992); COLO. Ray. STAT. § 13-90-
204 (1987); CAL EvD. CODE § 754 (West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 331
(Supp. 1992). See also, ALA. CODE § 12-21-131(f) (Supp. 1993) (stating that it is the
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have waiver requirements equivalent to or approximating those out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst2 51 Statutes also
vary as to specific provisions for the appointment of non-ASL inter-
preters,2 52 and nearly all express a preference, but not necessarily a
requirement, for certified, or at least qualified, interpreters.2 3 Few
require appointment of an interpreter to interpret attorney-client
communications during preparations for trial and during the trial
itself. 54
State interpreter laws, regardless of how comprehensive, exhibit
the same shortcomings as their federal counterpart, the Court Inter-
preters Act, when they are actually implemented on both the trial
and appellate levels. Courts often follow the statute literally even if
the result compromises a defendant's rights. People v. Hammons,25 5
a case decided in the Colorado Court of Appeals, is an example of
this problem. The defendant argued on appeal that he was unable to
communicate with his attorney during trial due to the court's refusal
responsibility of the deaf person to notify appointing authority and request inter-
preter prior to appearance in a proceeding); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A (Supp.
1992) (requiring that an interpreter be appointed by the court upon request of deaf
principal party in interest); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-33(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that deaf person or the court can request an interpreter).
251. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. Several states simply do not
mention what constitutes a waiver of the right to an interpreter under the statute.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (Supp. 1993); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754 (West Supp.
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A
(Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-33 (West Supp. 1993). Compare, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(G) (1992) ("A deaf person entitled to the services of
an interpreter under this section may knowingly and intelligently waive these ser-
vices."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-208 (1987) (requiring that waiver be in writing and
is subject to the approval of counsel and "appointing authority," and stating that
failure to request an interpreter cannot be deemed to be a waiver of the right to have
one provided); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A (West Supp. 1993) (requiring
"special finding" by the court that defendant waived right to interpreter "knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently").
252. See, e.g, CAL. EVID. CODE § 754 (West Supp. 1993) (oral, deaf-blind, and in-
termediary interpreters mentioned); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(F) (1992) (inter-
mediary interpreters). Most other statutes simply use the general term "interpreter."
253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-131(b) (Supp. 1993); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
242(H)(2) (1992); CAL. Evm. CODE § 754(f) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
90-202(4) (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(B) (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-33(a) (West Supp. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A(3) (West
Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 331(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
Also, some states specifically require trial courts before and during trial to ensure
that the interpretation is adequate. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A(1)
(West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-207 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-
A:4 (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(D) (West 1989).
254. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A (West Supp. 1993) (applying only
to instances when counsel has been appointed by the court to represent an indigent
defendant).
255. 771 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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to appoint a second ASL interpreter to sit at the defense table. The
court dismissed this assertion as being "without merit" since the
statute made no specific requirement of a second interpreter.2'
There was no discussion of the defendant's constitutional rights to
effective assistance of counsel or to assist in his defense. A similar
case was Turner v. State2 57 in which the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Alabama determined that a failure to request an interpreter was a
waiver of the right to have one even though it was not done know-
ingly or intelligently. This decision was based on Alabama law,
which places the duty to make the request upon the defendant and
his attorney.5 s
In sharp contrast to these approaches is a decision by the Court of
Appeals of Texas, Adams v. State..25  The defendant did not know
ASL, and simultaneous transcription was not specifically required
by the Texas statute. The court, however, looked beyond the text of
the statute. It also gave weight to an opinion by the Texas Attorney
General that clarified the duty of the trial court judge to protect the
constitutional rights of deaf criminal defendants, including a duty to
explore other methods of interpretation such as simultaneous tran-
scription.26 ° Even more important, the court recognized that the
statute was intended to facilitate a right that was already provided
to deaf defendants in Texas, under the United States and Texas
Constitutions, even if the statute did not specifically require simul-
taneous transcription and no specific request was made. The court
concluded: "[I]t is clear that Baltierra, Ferrell, and the Attorney
General of Texas have recognized an obligation outside the statute,
based on state and federal constitutional law, to fashion a remedy
suitable to overcome a particular defendant's disability."' Adams
presents a compelling demonstration of the need for interpretation
256. Id. at 2.
257. 429 So. 2d 645 (ALa Crim. App. 1982).
258. Id. at 647.
259. 749 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct App. 1988). See discussion of the case supra at text
accompanying notes 131, 141-45.
260. The opinion states:
[When notified that a defendant is deaf], a court does not have any discre-
tion as to whether an interpreter will be appointed, but does have discre-
tion as to whether it will appoint a person to interpret by use of sign lan-
guage or by use of an alternative method of communication that is more
appropriate to a specific deaf person .... [TJhe trial judge has the task
of insuring the minimum understanding necessary to the protection of...
constitutional rights [to confront witnesses and to assist in his own
defense]....
Id. at 638 (emphasis in original).
261. Id. at 639 (emphasis added). See also People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426,
432-33 (Sup. Ct. 1984), (regarding the central issue as whether due proces was pro-
vided and concluding that the applicable state statute was intended to protect consti-
tutional rights).
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because after the reversal of his conviction, the defendant was re-
tried using a CAT system and acquitted. The defense attorney
credited the acquittal to his client's assistance with the cross-exami-
nation of the alleged victim.
26 2
2. Maine's Interpreter Statute and Its Application in
State v. Green
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in contrast to the Texas court
in Adams, failed to recognize an "obligation outside the statute"
when it applied the Maine interpreter law in a 1989 case, State v.
Green.263 The decision demonstrates how a court's failure to use a
constitutional analysis allowed a conviction to stand when the de-
fendant's rights fell below the minimum required. Maine's statute26'
falls somewhere in-between the extremes of the most and least com-
prehensive state laws. It applies in civil and administrative as well
as criminal proceedings, and provides that, "[w]henever any per-
sonal or property interest of a deaf or hearing impaired person is the
subject of a proceeding before any agency or court, the presiding
officer of the proceeding shall, in consultation with the deaf or hear-
ing impaired person, appoint a qualified interpreter. '26 The Maine
statute gives preference to the use of certified interpreters2 0 and, at
a minimum, requires use of a "qualified interpreter," which is de-
fined as:
a person with the knowledge and understanding of the code of eth-
ics of the National Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who is able
to recognize the comprehension level of a deaf or hearing impaired
person and is able to communicate effectively in a mode of commu-
nication used by the deaf or hearing impaired person and to inter-
pret accurately the statements of the deaf or hearing impaired
person. 27
In practice, the statute works relatively well, according to the Pro-
gram Director of an agency providing interpreter services in legal
and quasi-legal settings. He has found generally that some courts,
but not many police districts, in Maine are sensitive to the impor-
tance of adequate interpretation. 6 8 If the agency is contacted for
interpreting assistance, and if Miranda rights need to be read, at
262. Gary Taylor, Computer Helps Acquit Deaf Defendant; Preserving 6th
Amendment Right, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 21. See also supra note 41.
263. 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989).
264. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992-93).
265. Id. § 48(2).
266. "In appointing a qualified interpreter, the presiding officer shall give first
consideration to persons who are certified by the National Registry of Interpreters for
the Deaf." Id. § 48(2)(B).
267. Id. § 48(1)(G).
268. Interview with Douglas Newton, supra note 4.
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least two certified interpreters, one of whom is often a Deaf inter-
preter, are sent2 69 to provide interpretation throughout police ques-
tioning, trial preparations, and any court proceedings. The largest
barrier to effective implementation of the statute, however, is the
failure by court and police personnel to recognize the need for
interpretation.
The problem is particularly acute when a deaf person in the court
system does not use ASL or her hearing impairment is not readily
apparent to those involved. Such persons can "slip through the
cracks" when the need for interpretation is not addressed from the
outset. Such was the case in State v. Green,2 70 the Law Court's only
opinion addressing an appeal of a deaf criminal defendant where the
defendant sought reversal on the basis of inadequate interpretation.
The defendant, Dean Green, was deaf and did not know ASL. He
was charged with rape and convicted after a two-day jury trial2 1
His attorney brought a friend of Green's to serve as a "quasi-inter-
preter" and to testify as the only witness for the defense. 2 The rec-
ord does not reveal how interpretation was provided, if this individ-
ual was certified, or if he was at all qualified to provide the
interpretation. The trial court made no inquiries of this kind, and
the court and the defendant never addressed each other directly.
The record does reveal, however, that the court did not consider the
friend to be providing a "real formal interpretation. . . We will try
to tell [the defendant] what's going on from the witness stand." 3
Green was convicted and obtained new counsel to seek a motion
for a new trial.27 "4 The new attorney moved for the appointment of a
qualified interpreter. He also requested a copy of the transcript so
that Green could assist in the preparation of the motion; Green
claimed he was unable to follow much of the testimony.210 The mo-
tion for a transcript was denied. A certified oral interpreter was pro-
vided for the hearing on the motion for a new trial which was denied
269. There are several reasons for sending more than one interpreter on legal in-
terpreting assignments including assisting each other with certain terms and relieving
an interpreter who becomes fatigued. Douglas Newton, supra note 4, estimate3 that
interpreters need to rest every half hour, it is particularly mentally and physically
exhausting work in courtroom settings. It has proven beneficial that during trial one
interpreter is positioned in front of the deaf person and the other is at the counsel
table to monitor the accuracy of the interpretation as well as to interpret all attorney-
client communications.
270. 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989).
271. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989) (YOR-83-
407).
272. State v. Green, 564 A.2d at 63.
273. Remarks by Maine Superior Court Justice Broderick, Brief for Appellant at
3.
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id. at 4.
1994]
MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:87
as well.27 Prior to sentencing, the trial court judge stated on the
record that formal interpretation had been offered (although this
does not appear anywhere in the record) and "[f]rom where I sat
Mr. Green seemed to follow all of the testimony very atten-
tively. . . .As far as I'm concerned Mr. Green was able to follow
what was happening during trial. 27 7 Green was sentenced to twenty
years, the maximum allowable sentence.
The Law Court affirmed the conviction. 278 Since no objection to
the inadequate interpretation was made during trial, the court re-
stricted its review to a determination of "whether the asserted error,
if error at all, was 'so highly prejudicial and so taints the proceeding
as to virtually deprive the aggrieved party of a fair trial.' "27 The
276. According to Douglas Newton, supra note 4, there are no certified oral inter-
preters in Maine; the interpreter he provided for Green traveled from Massachusetts
to interpret the proceedings.
277. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989) (YOR-88-
407). The State's brief provides several transcript references where the court ad-
dressed the issue of the defendant's deafness. Presumably, if the court made a refer-
ence on the record where a specific offer of a certified interpreter was made and re-
fused, the state would have brought this to the Law Court's attention. The brief for
the defendant claims that there was no consultation with the defendant on the rec-
ord. Brief for Appellant at 14.
It should also be noted, as it was in Defendant's brief, that the trial court could
have required proof of the defendant's deafness under the statute if it had any doubt
as to the severity of the impairment. Id. at 15; see M#. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 48(2)(C) (West 1989).
278. State v. Green, 564 A.2d at 64.
279. Id. at 63 (quoting State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468 (Me. 1981)). The Law
Court also stated that this would be the applicable standard regardless of whether a
constitutional or statutory right was involved and attributed this rule to State v.
Christianson, 404 A.2d 999, 1005 (Me. 1979) (holding that when defendant failed to
assert violation of right to confrontation at trial, "our review of the issue is confined
to the determination whether the error thus asserted, if error at all, was so serious in
its effect upon defendant's trial that the trial was rendered unfair."). But see DAVID
P. CLUCHEY AND MICHAEL D. SEITzINGER, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE, § 52.2 (rev. ed.
1991) ("As a practical matter, the Law Court is likely to exercise its discretion to
examine serious constitutional error under Rule 52(b) ["obvious error" rule] even
when it has not been noted below.").
It is worth noting that in all but a few of the cases in both the state and federal
courts that have found a compromise of defendant's rights, there had been no objec-
tion at trial to the inadequacy of interpretation. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 749 S.W.2d
635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d
Cir. 1979). See also supra note 200, which discusses two cases in which failure to
object to inadequate interpretation amounted to deprivation of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
See also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), where a defense attorney failed
to move for the exclusion of confessions obtained by torture once the fact of coercions
had been proved, and the Court held "[t]hat complaint [of admission of the confes-
sions by the trial court] is not of the commission of mere error, but of a wrong so
fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and ren-
dered the conviction and sentence wholly void .... We are not concerned with a
mere question of state practice .... " Id. at 286-87 (citations omitted). See discus-
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only error found by the court was the trial court's failure to adminis-
ter an oath to the quasi-interpreter, and that did not rise to the
level of "obvious error. '280 The court did not address the more sig-
nificant violations of the statute such as failure to review the qualifi-
cations of a person who could not even be considered an "inter-
preter," not to mention a "qualified interpreter," under the
definition in the statute. " Also, no consultation with the defendant,
as is required by the statute,282 appears on the record.
Most important, however, the Law Court failed to make a deter-
mination of whether Green's constitutional rights were protected.
Stating that the same standard of review will be used, regardless of
whether the protected rights were statutory or constitutional, should
not end the analysis of the constitutional aspects of Green's appeal.
Even if the violation of the statute was minor, as the Law Court
viewed it to be, the court was nonetheless obligated to ensure that
the defendant's constitutional rights were at the minimum level re-
quired by the United States and Maine Constitutions as outlined in
the cases discussed in Part III of this Comment. Although both par-
ties briefed the constitutional aspect of this case extensivelym the
Law Court conducted no analysis in this area.2 " The fact that the
sion infra of standard of review at notes 318-23 and accompanying text.
280. State v. Green, 564 A.2d at 64. The Law Court based this finding, in part, on
what it saw as a failure of the defendant to allege any difficulty understanding testi-
mony. Id. In his brief, however, the defendant refers to the transcript of the motion
for trial transcript where the defense counsel made the request, in part, because "Ap-
pellant had been unable to understand the testimony of the victim at trial, even with
the assistance of a quasi-interpreter ..... Brief for Appellant at 4-5. This claim was
acknowledged on the record by the Superior Court Justice. Id. at 5.
281. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
282. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2) (West 1989).
283. The State of Maine argued that "[although] it has long been recognized in
American jurisprudence, that an accused ... is entitled to interpretive services when
he cannot otherwise understand or comprehend the criminal proceedings against
hin. ... [T]his right does not rise to one of absolute constitutional dimensions."
Brief for Appellee at 10. The State claimed that the defendant was able to under-
stand the proceedings and that the trial court "complied with the requirements and
spirit of [Mx. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48] when he, in consultation with Mr. Green
through his attorney, appointed an interpreter who in Defendant's opinion was best
qualified to understand and assist the Defendant." Brief for Appellee at 13. Although
it is true that Green's attorney told the court that he thought the friend "knows the
Defendant very well, is an excellent lip reader and can communicate with Defendant
probably better than any other individual immediately available," Brief for Appellee
at 3 (text of defendant's Motion to Continue to provide for availability of the quasi-
interpreter) (emphasis added), this statement cannot be considered a knowing and
intelligent waiver by the defendant himself of the right to a certified, or at least qual-
ified, oral interpreter.
284. A further irony in this case is that the Law Court referred to the cases of
Terry v. State and United States ex rel. Negron v. New York in an earlier case, State
v. Doucette, 398 A.2d 36 (Me. 1978), as standing for "the unquestioned principle that
a defendant must be afforded the means to understand the proceedings against him."
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inadequate interpretation was not raised by the defendant prior to
his conviction should not be considered conclusive evidence of the
adequacy of the interpretation.2 5 Only a knowing and intelligent
waiver could be a basis for finding no compromise of Green's rights.
A constitutional analysis probably would have resulted in a reversal
and a remand for a new trial as it did in Adams 28e since it is impos-
sible to determine from the record whether the defendant under-
stood the proceedings or was able to communicate with his attorney
sufficiently. In the absence of such findings or a waiver, the court
should not conclude that Green was afforded all of his constitutional
rights at trial.
3. Federal Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination in Public
Services
Other sources of statutory protection of the right to interpretation
in state courts can be found in federal laws, such as section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973287 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA),2 8 both of which prohibit discrimination in
public services against disabled persons. Before discussing the appli-
cation of these laws to the right to interpretation in state courts, it
is important to note the ambivalence felt by many members of the
Deaf community toward seeking protection under laws designed to
protect the disabled.2 19 Many people, hearing and deaf, who work in
the Deaf community dispute any notion that deaf people are "dis-
abled." This is part of an effort to recognize the Deaf community as
a linguistic and cultural minority rather than a group of people con-
nected by a "medical dysfunction.
29 0
Id. at 40. The context of that discussion, however, was the appeal of a hearing de-
fendant who alleged that he had been deprived of a fair trial due to the alleged bias
of the ASL interpreter who translated the victim's testimony. Id.
285. The trial court made references to the fact that the defendant had conversa-
tions with police without an interpreter. Brief for Appellee at 4, sentencing transcript,
pp. 67-68. As discussed supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, the ability to fol-
low the essence of one-on-one conversations is no indication that one can understand
the testimony of a person thirty feet away, in circumstances that make speechreading
more difficult. Moreover, the fact that the police officers could understand the de-
fendant indicates that he lost his hearing later in life, but not the degree of his hear-
ing impairment.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
287. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1993).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (Supp. 1I 1991).
289. PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 16, at 44. The authors describe the awk-
wardness experienced in a conversation where a deaf man told his friends that he
uses a "handicapped" transit pass to use the city buses.
290. See LANE, supra note 12, for a detailed discussion of the attempts of the
"audist establishment" to medicalize deafness. This Comment does not reject that
position by discussing legislation providing access to federal programs. These laws are
a necessary part of the survey of existing statutory protections addressing interpreta-
tion that can and have been used. See also, Dolnick, supra note 12, at 37.
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The Rehabilitation Act is regarded as the first major civil rights
bill for the disabled and prohibits discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability in all federally funded programs.2 1 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this statute to guarantee "meaningful access" to these
programs for qualified disabled people.2 9 2 The regulations require
accessibility in terms of communication as well as mobility.20 3 The
case law for deaf people under the Rehabilitation Act has been
largely disappointing. Many of the cases have involved employment
discrimination or access to federally funded educational programs,
and courts have concluded that deafness can be an acceptable rea-
son to bar someone from a job or program.2 There has been suc-
cess, however, in several cases where courts have read the regula-
tions as specifically requiring appointment and funding of
interpreters for deaf graduate students.295 The significance of those
cases is that the regulations were interpreted as not only prohibiting
discrimination that actually bars participation, but as imposing an
affirmative duty on the part of the recipient of federal funds to pro-
vide interpretation to ensure full participation.
The Rehabilitation Act provides the right to an interpreter in
state courts, but the specific provision is neither well defined nor
widely recognized. The actual text of the law is very broad and pro-
vides: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States. . .shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... ',218 The specific requirements of
the law are provided in Justice Department regulations; 207 however,
291. 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a) (1992). Elaine Gardner of the National Center for Law
and Deafness, supra note 2, stated that the law has never been considered applicable
to federal courts, however.
292. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
293. 28 C.F.R. § 41.511(e) (1991) (promulgated pursuant to Executive Order
12250, requiring the U.S. Department of Justice to coordinate the implementation of
§ 41.1).
294. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (up-
holding refusal of college to admit deaf woman to clinical nursing program on the
basis of her deafness and finding that intent of the Rehabilitation Act was to ban
discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped people, not to require hiring
of people despite their disability).
295. See, e.g., Jones v. Illinois Dep't Rehabilitation Servs. 689 F.2d 724, 729-30
(7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a state department of rehabilitation services had pri-
mary burden of providing interpreter services to deaf college student); Camenisch v.
University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the trial court
properly granted injunctive relief to a deaf graduate student seeking interpretation
services from a university), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390
(1981).
296. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1993).
297. The Justice Department regulations require that-
Recipients shall insure that communications with their applicants, employ-
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there is no language indicating that courts are bound by those re-
quirements or that interpretation must always be provided. Rather,
the sole reference to interpretation in courts appears in a comment
accompanying the final regulation:
Court systems receiving Federal financial assistance shall provide
for the availability of qualified interpreters for civil and criminal
court proceedings involving persons with hearing or speaking im-
pairments .... Where a recipient has an obligation to provide
qualified interpreters under this subpart the recipient has the cor-
responding responsibility to pay for the services of the
interpreter." 8
The language of the comment clearly requires interpretation but one
has to know exactly where to look to find it. Moreover, the regula-
tions and comment are silent on the requirements of waiver, simul-
taneous translation, time of appointment, and who has the responsi-
bility to ensure that communications are adequate. Provisions such
as these are necessary to assure protection of the deaf defendants'
constitutional rights.
Despite the clear language of the comment, the Rehabilitation Act
has never been the basis of a criminal appeal. The statute has been
raised in two courtroom interpretation cases in federal district court,
neither of which resolved the issue of the statute's applicability or
involved deaf criminal defendants. Dobard v. Oakland/Piedmont
Municipal Court29 was an action by a deaf man who requested a
computer assisted transcript system (CAT) in his traffic court case.
Although the court appeared willing to read the language of the Re-
habilitation Act to require courtroom interpretation,300 the court
ees and beneficiaries are effectively conveyed to those having impaired vi-
sion and hearing .... A recipient that employs fifteen or more persons
shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons
with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make
such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation of
such persons in a program receiving Federal financial assistance. Such aux-
iliary aids may include... qualified interpreters.
28 C.F.R. § 42.503(e)-(f) (1992).
298. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,630 (1980). The comments also indicate a preference for cer-
tified interpreters and require services of an interpreter to be provided "for all phases
of the preparation and presentation of the defendant's case" where the defendant had
qualified for a court-appointed attorney. Id.
299. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10756 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1992).
300. The court noted:
If section 504 protects anything, it should insure that all individuals, re-
gardless of their disability, have access to the Federal and State court-
houses. Plaintiff is completely without the ability to hear. He can neither
read lips nor understand sign language .... Absent communicating
through the use of a pad and pen, plaintiff has no means of communicating
with the court or counsel except by means of a CAT system or an
equivalent device.
Id. at 9-10.
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found that the traffic court did not receive any federal funding and
dismissed the case for other reasons. The other case, Auraham u.
Zaffarano,3 1 involved a deaf plaintiff in a state court civil action.
The claim for interpretation under the Rehabilitation Act survived a
motion to dismiss and the funding requirement was never discussed
in the ruling. The only criminal context in which the Rehabilitation
Act has been used by a deaf person was a Ninth Circuit case, Bon-
ner v. Lewis,30 2 in which a prisoner won the right to an interpreter
for, among other things, prison disciplinary proceedings.303 Surely,
however, one does not have to wait to be convicted to receive protec-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act.
A more promising potential source of statutory protection in state
courts is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.30 Title II of
the ADA305 extends the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act to all
state and local services, not only those receiving federal funding, but
exempts the federal government.306 As with the Rehabilitation Act,
the language of the ADA fails to describe trial courts' obligations to
provide interpretation under this law. The applicable section of the
regulations implementing Title H does not provide any express re-
quirement for use of interpreters in state courts for parties, wit-
nesses, or jurors.30 7 Discussion of access to communication in court-
rooms is completely absent from the extensive legislative history23
A comment accompanying the regulations contains, once again, the
only reference to interpretation in courts by instructing courts not
301. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10373 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1991).
302. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
303. Id. at 567. This was the sole source of the right; the court rejected the appli-
cability of state interpreter laws, the Due Process Clause, and the Eighth
Amendment.
304. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Supp. m 1991).
305. "Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disabil-
ity shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. III 1991).
306. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991). See also Anne B. Thomas, Beyond the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 NXf L. Rav.
243 (1992) (asserting that the ADA will be a highly significant law only if compliance
by state and local governments is enforced strictly).
307. The implementing regulations provide:
A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and service3 where
necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to
participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity con-
ducted by a public entity.... In determining what type of auxiliary aid
and service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to
the requests of the individual with disabilities.
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b) (1992).
308. HR REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.
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to include interpreter fees as part of "court costs."30 9 This is the
only suggestion that the statute provides a right to interpretation in
court.
One difficulty in applying the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA is
that deafness is an "invisible disability" (if one at all).310 For exam-
ple, few agencies are surprised by a requirement to provide a ramp
into a welfare office but they may balk at having to locate, provide,
and pay for an interpreter for an application interview.3 11 It may not
occur to courts to look to the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act for an
obligation to appoint a qualified interpreter, especially since, in the
thirteen years since the publication of the Justice Department's reg-
ulations for section 504, this requirement has never been raised in
any criminal appeals in state court.
Despite the Department of Justice comment on the requirement
of interpretation, there are at least two primary barriers to applying
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in an appeal in state court or a
federal habeas corpus petition. First, it is unclear what remedy
under either statute would be available to criminal defendants who
faced trial with inadequate interpretation. The ADA regulations do
not contemplate use in a criminal trial context since they provide
only for administrative complaint procedures or civil actions against
the government for damages to remedy the alleged discrimination. 1 '
309. "The Department [of Justice] has already recognized that imposition of the
cost of courtroom interpreter services is impermissible under section 504 .... Ac-
cordingly, recouping the costs of interpreter services by assessing them as part of
court costs would also be prohibited [under the ADA]." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,705-706
(1991). See also Baker v. Louisiana, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21599, 5 (W.D. La. Sept.
4, 1992).
310. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 23.
311. This observation is based upon my personal experience as a paralegal in a
legal services office. A deaf client of mine received a notice requiring him to attend a
"recertification interview" in the federal food stamp program. The notice indicated
that if he did not appear for this appointment his food stamps would be terminated.
The welfare office, a recipient of federal funds, did not have a TDD (telecommunica-
tion device'for the deaf). The notice made no mention of a right to an interpreter or
the fact that my client was deaf, although this was known to the caseworker. When I
called to ask the worker to provide an interpreter for the interview the response was
"Can't he bring someone? Why don't you come?" Eventually the "interview" was
conducted in my office over the phone; I asked the worker's questions and told her
my client's responses. I surveyed informally four other deaf food stamp recipients, all
of whom told me that their caseworkers expected them to bring a family member or
friend to appointments, or that they communicated through note-writing. This pat-
tern was also noted in the "public comment" to the ADA regulations. 28 C.F.R. pt.
35, app. A, § 35.104, at 436 (1992).
312. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170, 35.175, 35.178 (1992). Also, unlike the Rehabilitation
Act, the ADA allows state and local governments to be sued directly without Elev.
enth Amendment immunity. "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act .... [Riemedies (in-
cluding remedies both at law and in equity) are available." 28 C.F.R. § 35.178. Al-
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Second, since the "agency" involved is a state court system, an ac-
tion in federal court to obtain an injunction during the proceedings
would involve the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine.3 1 3 The Su-
preme Court held in the 1971 case that, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances, issues of federalism prevent interference by federal
courts in ongoing state criminal proceedings. The ADA, therefore,
has serious drawbacks and limitations in this context. Moreover, any
development in the right to interpretation under the ADA would be
a mixed blessing for many members of the Deaf community who
strive to avoid a label of "disabled."
Therefore, although many state and federal laws were passed with
the intention of requiring interpretation at trial, they have failed to
provide the protections required by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The lack of uniformity among state laws results in
unequal treatment of defendants. Courts and counsel have ignored
federal laws as a source of rights and duties. Moreover, many courts
have actually retreated from discussing the constitutional dimension
of the right to interpretation and have instead analyzed the appeal
on the basis of the statutory requirements only. As seen in State v.
Green, the tendency of courts to approach the right to interpreta-
tion as existing wholly within the statute without examining the
overall result, can have substantial consequences for the defendant.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE
CONsTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
It may appear initially that the interpretation needs of deaf de-
fendants can be met with more comprehensive legislation. An exam-
ination of the case law, however, demonstrates why it is crucial for
courts to review the appeals of deaf criminal defendants using the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as statutory law, as the
bases for their analyses. The primary reason is the essential differ-
ence between a statute and a constitution. On a practical level, be-
cause the communication needs of deaf criminal defendants vary
greatly, no statute could be comprehensive enough to protect the
rights of all. The Constitution, on the other hand, establishes the
though the Rehabilitation Act did not contain a similar provision, it is unclear what
impact this would have in the area of criminal proceedings. Government immunity
was not raised in either Dobard or Avraham, discussed supra at notes 299-302 and
accompanying text.
313. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). Two federal cases actually addres3
this issue in similar contexts. Avraham v. Zaffarano, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10373
(E.D. Pa. July 22, 1991) discussed supra at note 301 and accompanying text, found
that Younger abstention did not prevent a deaf civil plaintiff from seeking relief
under the Rehabilitation Act in federal court. The First Circuit, however in Jackson
v. Garcia, 665 F.2d 395, 396 (Ist Cir. 1981), found that Younger precluded an attack
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to compel the courts of Puerto Rico to conduct all proceed-
ings in English.
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basic minimum quantum of rights of every defendant, hearing or
deaf; it is a starting point, not the full extent. Thomas Paine wrote
that a constitution is "to liberty, what a grammar is to language. '3 1'
The statutes should be seen as a source of procedure to implement
these rights, and not as a source of the rights themselves.
As laws are passed to provide more protection, the courts tend to
concern themselves primarily with statutory requirements, such as
administering an oath to an interpreter 3 15 rather than ensuring that
a defendant's communications with his attorney prior to and during
trial are unimpaired. In fact, some of the most important discussions
of the right to interpretation were in early cases such as Terrys1
and Mothershead,3 17 decided in the absence of any statutes. Few
courts since have made such unequivocal statements that the basis
of this right lies in both the federal and state constitutions.
One of the most compelling reasons to recognize a constitutional
right is the impact of the standard of review used by appellate
courts. s 8 Most courts, especially in cases interpreting the Court In-
terpreters Act, give exceptionally broad discretion to trial courts' de-
terminations of the need for and adequacy of interpretation.s1 9 The
discretion given to trial courts is particularly problematic in deaf
defendants' appeals. A trial court's assessment of the interpretation
needs can reflect erroneous assumptions made by hearing people
about "lipreading" and ASL interpretation, unfamiliarity with the
particular difficulties of interpreting in courtroom situations, and
underestimation of the need for educated, trained, and certified in-
terpreters. Findings of "fact" reviewed by appellate courts include
comments such as that the defendant looked "alert" or nodded820
during trial as indications of comprehension, although no actual evi-
dence of the defendant's ability to hear is discussed.321 Evidence of
314. THoMAs PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, as quoted in CHARUES HOWARD MCILwAIN,
CONSTITUTIONALIsM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 2 (1947).
315. See, e.g., State v. Green, 564 A.2d 62 (Me. 1989), discussed supra notes 263-
86 and accompanying text.
316. 105 So. 386 (Ala. 1925).
317. 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940).
318. See also supra note 279.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990) cert. denied,
Ill S.Ct. 2055 (1991), supra text accompanying notes 242-45; Valladares v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989), supra text accompanying notes 238-41; United
States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Estevez v.
United States, 492 U.S. 908 (1989), supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
320. See discussion of nodding, supra note 72 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., People v. Branson, 475 N.E.2d 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Many deaf
people are particularly alert in response to oral conversation even if they understand
little; in the absence of aural information deaf people must gain information from
visual cues, but it is not complete comprehension.
It is not suggested that trial courts' findings are always incorrect. In many of the
cases discussed in this Comment, it is possible that the trial court's conclusions were
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comprehension could include, for example, audiological tests or
other medical records which trial courts are permitted to require by
many statutes. 22 Also, a defendant could be asked specific questions
about the testimony or the right she is waiving, not simply if she
understood in general. A defendant herself may not know if she un-
derstood fully until that comprehension is actually tested.
Federal and state courts use a heightened standard of review
when the issue is whether constitutional errors occurred during a
trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 distinguishes what trial
court errors can be reversed. "Harmless error" is "[a]ny error, de-
fect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights" and can be disregarded by the appellate court.s2- "Plain er-
ror," by contrast, is one that does affect the "substantial rights" of
the defendant and can be reviewed even if it was not preserved for
appeal during trial.3 24 Although the United States Supreme Court,
in Chapman v. California,325 acknowledged that "harmless constitu-
tional error" can exist, "the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."3 20 Deprivations of
certain rights, including the right to counsel at trial, can never be
"harmless error."327 Even if a violation of the defendant's right was
not the subject of an objection at trial, as is the case for many deaf
defendants, appellate courts may nonetheless grant relief if it is
correct. The problem, however, is that appellate courts are willing to defer to these
findings even in the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so. The examples supra at
note 108 demonstrate that trial courts can and have made erroneous assessments of a
defendant's hearing and comprehension.
322. See, e.g., Mn. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(C) (West 1989). The burden to
settle the question of the need for interpretation should rest on the prosecutors for
practical and policy reasons. First, a deaf person should not be required to obtain
tests for a physical characteristic that has existed for many years, or even a lifetime.
Most deaf persons have no reason to routinely submit to these tests. Second, there is
simply no reason why someone would exaggerate her or his deafness; interpretation at
trial is something that is of benefit only if one has some limitation in comprehension.
Denials of, rather than requests for, interpretation should be viewed with suspicion
by the trial court.
323. FED. R. CRIA. P. 52(a).
324. FED. R CRmL P. 52(b). M& R. CRmi P. 52(b) is substantially similar except
that it refers to "obvious error" rather than "plain error."
325. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
326. Id. at 24. The Maine Law Court recently reiterated that it differentiates be-
tween constitutional violations and other errors: "Where constitutional violations are
claimed to be harmless, a heightened standard applies, namely, that the error must
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is more strict than that used
for errors which are not of constitutional magnitude." State v. Hassapelis, 620 A.2d
288, 291 n.4 (Me. 1993) (citation omitted).
327. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984) ("Circumstances
... may be present on some occasions when although counsel is available to assist
the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one,
could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is ap-
propriate .... ).
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found to be "plain error." The Supreme Court has said of Rule
52(b): "It grants the courts of appeals the latitude to correct partic-
ularly egregious errors on appeal regardless of a defendant's trial de-
fault ... ."8 Moreover, courts have recognized that trial courts
have an affirmative duty to protect the constitutional rights of de-
fendants even if defendants and their attorneys take no steps to do
so themselves.3 29 These rules demonstrate that the treatment on ap-
peal of violations of constitutional rights is significantly different
from the treatment of other rights.
The standard of review also guides the actions of the trial court
and the degree of respect it provides a particular right. If judges are
aware that the right to interpretation must be guarded with the
same vigilance as the rights to confrontation and counsel, they may
hesitate before concluding that a deaf person has adequate compre-
hension of the proceedings.
Recognition of a constitutional right to interpretation would also
require courts to apply the rule of Johnson v. Zerbst.330 The pre-
sumption against waiver of a constitutional right has been a corner-
stone of criminal constitutional protection for more than fifty years.
If a right must be waived knowingly and intelligently, failure to re-
quest an interpreter, for example, cannot be deemed to be a waiver
of the right to interpretation. Negron specifically found this to be
true, applying the rule in Zerbst.33 Most appeals of deaf criminal
defendants arise out of trials in which the defense counsel never re-
quested an interpreter, and the trial court assumed the defendant
could understand the proceedings, regardless of the degree of com-
prehension that actually existed . 32 This factor is especially impor-
tant since most deaf people and defense attorneys do not know of
the right to interpretation under statutory law. 333 Furthermore,
cases have demonstrated that a deaf person's attorney may not have
a full understanding of the degree of her client's hearing
impairment.3 14
Another important consideration is that state court defendants
would have a constitutional basis upon which to file a federal habeas
corpus petition.3 35 Negron, Ferrell, and Mothershead were cases
that granted habeas corpus petitions based upon a constitutional
328. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982).
329. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that
ensuring that the defendant has sufficient understanding of the proceedings against
him to be able to assist in his own defense is primarily the task of the trial judge).
330. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See supra notes 89-90.
331. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970).
332. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645, 647 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v.
Green, 564 A.2d 62, 64 (Me. 1989). See also supra note 279.
333. See supra note 90.
334. See supra notes 108 and 200.
335. See supra note 8.
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right to interpretation.3 "6 Felts v. Murphy33* and an early Tenth
Circuit case involving a deaf defendant, Stevens v. Page, - were
cases in which courts denied the habeas corpus petitions of defend-
ants who could not understand the proceedings on the basis that
there was no deprivation of a constitutional right, despite the inade-
quate interpretation. However, since the right to bring a habeas
corpus petition has been restricted greatly over the past several
terms of the Supreme Court, this distinction between constitutional
and statutory rights may become less important in the context of
habeas corpus. 39
Recognition of a constitutional right to an interpreter could also
have a bearing on who pays for interpreter fees. Many statutes do
not specify a state's obligation to pay fees, and it rarely arises in
appellate decisions. One federal court in a habeas corpus case held
that a state trial court had violated a Spanish-speaking defendant's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to inquire into
his actual need and ability to pay for interpretation.3 0 This raises
the question of whether an interpreter should be seen as an individ-
ual whose assistance is required by the Constitution in the same way
that an attorney is needed, or if the interpreter is equivalent to
"equipment" for a courtroom. If the former approach is used, a
need-based determination would precede the appointment of an in-
terpreter. The latter approach, however, would require a state to
provide interpretation regardless of the defendant's financial situa-
tion. The second would appear to be a fairer approach since a crimi-
nal defendant is not required to pay for courtroom equipment such
as microphones or light bulbs to provide sensory assistance for non-
deaf parties. Moreover, the need-based approach would become
336. Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Negron
v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970); Mothershead v. King, 112 F.2d 1004 (8th
Cir. 1940).
337. 201 U.S. 123 (1906).
338. 420 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1969).
339. Recently, in fact, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit case where the circuit
court was willing to allow an evidentiary hearing on whether a Spanish-speaking de-
fendant understood the nature of the charge when it was alleged that the interpreter
inadequately explained the mens rea element before a nolo contendre plea was en-
tered. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 (1992).
340. Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F. Supp. 504 (=.D. Fla. 1989). The facts of
the case limit the holding since the defendant could pay for an attorney or an inter-
preter but not both. See id. at 506. But see United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902
(2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (suggesting that non-indigent defendants do
not have a right to a court-appointed interpreter).
The ADA and § 504 suggest that it would be incorrect to attach the right to a free
interpreter to the right to a free attorney;, would a person in a wheelchair, for exam-
ple, be required to pay in part or in full for the ramp into the courthouse? Even the
comments accompanying the promulgation of the § 504 regulations, however, suggest
that only indigent criminal defendants can receive the assistance of an interpreter for
pre-trial preparations. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,630 (1980).
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more problematic if a CAT or other mechanical system was
required.
Finally, the recognition of this right as derived from the principles
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, independent of statutory
rights, could avoid the discomfort within the Deaf community that
accompanies any reliance on "special legislation" such as the Reha-
bilitation Act or the ADA addressing disabled people as a cate-
gory.3 41 It would be understood that a statute involving interpreta-
tion does not create special rights for deaf people, but ensures the
implementation of general rights already present, but not readily
apparent to hearing people.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Rivera and Adams, the courts' analyses were consistent with,
and protective of, the defendants' full constitutional rights, includ-
ing their right to interpretation. Their reasoning and sensitivity to
issues facing deaf people suggest a model approach to be followed by
other courts for the following reasons. First is these courts' under-
standing of the complexity of deafness and the limitations of making
audiological diagnoses either from the bench or from reading appel-
late briefs. Second is an acknowledgment that the relevant statutes
do not determine the extent of the constitutional protection, but
rather operate as legislative guidance on its implementation. Third
is a recognition that it is the trial court judge, not the defense coun-
sel or defendant, who serves as the primary protector of the defend-
ant's constitutional rights. Fourth is the recognition that a failure to
raise the issue of inadequate interpretation at trial is not evidence
that a defendant understood the proceedings fully.
The cases examined in this Comment indicate that new standards
need to be articulated and used by trial and appellate courts where
proceedings involve deaf or hearing-impaired defendants. At the
trial level, courts cannot rely exclusively on defense counsels' assess-
ments of the interpretation needs of defendants since attorneys may
be unaware of the individual needs of their clients or the availability
of interpretation resources. If defense counsel indicates that no in-
terpretation is needed, the trial court judge has a duty to inquire
into how the defendant will be able to understand testimony and
communicate with his or her attorney. This inquiry should consist of
direct interaction with the defendant to ensure that his or her right
to interpretation (including, if necessary, the right to a CAT system)
has been fully explained and that it is being waived knowingly, vol-
untarily, and intelligently. The trial court should also tell defend-
ants that if at any time during trial they are unable to follow the
proceedings, they can invoke the right to interpretation. If interpre-
341. Interview with Polly Lawson, supra note 4.
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tation of any kind has been requested by the defendant, and the
trial court decides that it is not required, the court should provide
objective audiological evidence as the basis of that decision. If inter-
preters are used, the trial court should ensure that they are certified
and adequately trained.
Appellate courts must carefully review the appeals of deaf defend-
ants. If there was no interpretation at trial, they should look to the
circumstances of the proceedings. If objective evidence of moderate
to severe hearing loss was offered, then the court must find a viola-
tion of constitutional rights. If the defendant could not understand
the testimony, a reviewing court should find a deprivation of the
right to confrontation. If the defendant was not able to conmuni-
cate adequately with the defense attorney, then the court should
find a violation of the rights to effective assistance of counsel and to
assist in one's own defense. The use of noncertified or unqualified
interpreters should be prima facie evidence of inadequate interpre-
tation. if the defendant did not request interpretation, the appellate
court should examine the record for a knowing and intelligent
waiver that would meet the requirements of Zerbst. Findings of fact
involving a defendant's interpretation needs should not be given
deference absent objective evidence. An unwillingness to yield to a
trial judge's determination of the extent of the defendant's hearing
loss and interpretation needs would encourage more careful deci-
sion-making by trial judges and avoid the necessity of retrial. In
short, trial and appellate courts must act in concert to ensure that
all deaf defendants are provided their full constitutional rights.
What makes the issue of the right to interpretation compelling is
that, in most cases, a solution to the communication barrier is read-
ily available. What courts need to consider is the rationale behind
the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It is inconsistent to recognize a right to confront pros-
ecution witnesses yet not recognize a right to understand their testi-
mony; to provide assistance of counsel without providing the means
to communicate with that counsel before or during trial; and to up-
hold a defendant's right to be present and assist in one's defense but
deny the ability to do so in any meaningful sense. Would we allow
such chiseling of the rights of a hearing defendant? Would we, for
example, ask him to leave the room during part of the prosecution's
key witnesses' testimony? Would we allow him to sit at counsel ta-
ble but never write a note to or speak to his attorney? Would we
keep him from meeting with his attorney until after the trial began?
Would we allow a defendant to hear only every fourth word of the
prosecution witnesses' testimony? Would we allow the defendant to
learn about what happened during her trial only from newspaper
accounts and second-hand summaries of the testimony?
While these scenarios would clearly be offensive to most of us,
they are in fact what occurs when a deaf person is tried in the ab-
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sence of adequate interpretation. No special law would be sought to
eliminate such possibilities for hearing persons; such actions are all
examples of fundamental betrayals of our notions of justice, as em-
bodied in the Constitution. The same consideration must be ex-
tended to deaf persons as well. To deny deaf defendants the full
array of constitutional rights guaranteed to all criminal defendants
is, quite simply, to punish them for being deaf and to compromise
the effectiveness of the judicial process sought by the Constitution.
Deirdre M. Smith
